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 Definitions of sexual orientation are reflections of theoretical positions within the 
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1  
Sociological Problem 
 
 
Definitions and classifications of sexual orientation in research and theory are 
widely debated sociological issues with roots in the branch of philosophy known as 
metaphysics. Harry Kienzle (1970) argues “…to begin at the beginning, metaphysics is 
the ‘inquiry in the nature of ultimate reality’ (Castell, 1943:1-2); it involves both a theory 
of being, ontology, and a theory of knowledge, epistemology” (414). Ontological inquiry 
examines basic categories and relationships of being and what types of entities exist.  
Epistemological inquiry examines the nature and origin of knowledge. Epistemologists 
are concerned with the justification processes for what we take to be knowledge. 
Epistemological classifications in sexual orientation (such as heterosexual, homosexual 
and bisexual) are often taken for granted and assumed to have people that fit into them
1
. 
The epistemological question regarding sexual orientation is: how can we determine 
which people fit into each of these categories? Edward Stein (1999) argues, “the 
metaphysical question is concerned with whether these assumptions are right: are these 
categories natural human kinds, in other words, are there scientific laws that explain how 
people are sorted into these categories” (207)? These issues are central to untangling or 
clarifying the deep rooted problems surrounding definitions of sexual orientation. 
Examining what types of entities exist and their characteristic features is an 
ontological problem that is encompassed by the philosophical study of metaphysics. The 
metaphysical arguments between social constructionists/essentialists and 
nominalists/realists, in particular, have been important to how researchers and academic 
writers define and classify sexual orientation. The debate between social constructionism 
                                                 
1
 These epistemological classifications are assumed to have people to fit the categories in a natural or 
biological way and in a social or human labeling way.   
2  
and essentialism seeks to discover if sexual orientations are of a social nature (socially 
constructed) or whether they are governed by the laws of nature (essential). The debate 
between realism and nominalism regarding sexual orientation is concerned with whether 
sexual orientations are “real” categories (realism) or not “real”/empty categories 
(nominalism). Debates over the definitions and classifications of sexual orientations are 
unsettled matters. Judith Butler (2004) argues “…for practical and political reasons, there 
is no value to be derived in silencing disputes. The questions are: how best to have 
them… [and] how most productively to stage them…” (176)? The application of a 
cognitive sociological perspective provides a useful framework for analyzing the various 
types of definitions and classifications of sexual orientation without seeking out an 
epistemic truth or resolution to the debates (Karl Mannheim 1921: 84).  
Cognitive sociology provides a theoretical approach that is neither culturally 
individualistic nor culturally universalistic in its scope.  Eviatar Zerubavel (1997) 
explains that when approaching cognition people think on three different levels: as 
individuals, as social beings, and as human beings (5). Cultural individualism is 
concerned with the first level of analysis or how people think individually, whereas 
cultural universalism is concerned with how people think as human beings. Zerubavel 
argues,  
Each, therefore, is limited in its scope. In addressing the middle level, 
which covers the entire range between thinking as an individual and as a 
human being (thereby including, for example, thinking as a lawyer, as a 
German, as a baby boomer, as a Catholic, and as a radical feminist), 
cognitive sociology thus helps avoid the reductionistic tendencies often 
associated with either of those two extremes (6). 
 
3  
 A cognitive sociological framework for analyzing the definitions and classifications of 
sexual orientation is useful because it emphasizes the collective and social nature of each 
theoretical perspective.  
Analyzing definitions of sexual orientation are necessary because they are often 
used to position the theorist/researcher on a particular side of the social 
constructionist/essentialist and realist/nominalist debates. These two debates are 
concerned with whether or not sexual orientations are metaphysically: natural, social, or 
empty kinds. The debate about kinds
2
 is fundamental to research because the definitions 
of sexual orientation being used are largely defined by the researcher’s “membership” 
within a particular thought community or the world view the researcher is promoting. 
Zerubavel points out that our society is characterized by cognitive diversity or “cognitive 
pluralism.” This is a reason why people sometimes perceive things differently from 
others within a particular thought community. 
Zerubavel explains that thought communities represent mental communities that 
influence the thoughts and experiences of groups of individuals. Mannheim (1921) argues 
that individuals largely think in the same terms as the members inside of their groups. 
“He speaks the language of his group; he thinks in the manner in which his group thinks. 
He finds at his disposal only certain words and their meaning” (3).  Appropriation of the 
collective nature of these thought communities are allowable because, as Mannheim  
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 Kinds, meaning a way of being sorted into a group that is either natural: governed by the laws of nature, 
social: labeled only by the virtue of human intention, or empty: meaning that there is no such object 
(person/place/ or thing) that could fit into this category. This will be discussed in depth later in the paper. 
This brief definition is sufficient for understanding its use in this context. 
4  
suggests, these groups have developed particular “styles of thought” and “series of 
responses” to the stance of their positions (3). 
Organizing theoretical positions or perspectives of sexuality theorists and 
researchers into the framework of thought communities, is a cognitive sociological move 
that emphasizes the social nature of group thought. There are three distinct thought 
communities that appear to be debating the classifications and definitions of the same 
thing, sexual orientations; however they are participating in three separate debates.  
The natural kinds thought community shares the idea that sexual orientations are inherent 
or biologically innate. Stein states that Plato and Aristotle explained the significance of 
natural kinds with the metaphor that they “are the groups that enable us to ‘cut nature at 
its joints.’ Here the idea is that natural kinds divide nature into the groups that provide its 
underlying structure, the way bones give bodies their underlying structure” (78). If 
definitions for sexual orientation are organized with the assumption that they are natural 
kinds, then they assume that there is something deep or ‘biological’ about the origin of 
sexuality.
3
  
The social and empty kinds thought communities are often “lumped” together to 
form, “the social constructionist position.” This is problematic because essentialists or 
members from the natural kinds thought communities are debating against a perceived 
monolithic social constructionist entity, when they are really debating against two 
different socially based perspectives. The social kinds thought community argues that 
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 Natural kinds do not need to be biological i.e. gold atomic #79, but in the context of sexual orientation 
biological is appropriate. Gold is a natural kind in virtue of essence because ‘all’ things with the atomic #79 
are gold. Sexual orientation could possibly be a natural kind in a biological sense and not necessarily in the 
sense of being an essence. In fact, many essentialists do not think sexual orientation is essential based on 
essence, but rather on a biological basis, which will be discussed later in the paper in the social 
constructionist argument from the simplicity of essentialism. 
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sexual orientations organize people into categorizations by virtue of human labeling 
and/or social forces; whereas the empty kinds thought community contests the very 
existence of people who fit into these sexual categories.  
It is important to acknowledge the epistemological and metaphysical currents 
underlying the study of sexual orientation because these debates often result in a thought 
community talking amongst itself or thought communities talking past each other.  
Mannheim points out that “intellectual antagonisms” often result from people operating 
under completely different outlooks with completely different mental structures (280). 
Mannheim argues,  
The sociology of knowledge seeks to overcome the ‘talking past one 
another’ of the various antagonists by taking as its explicit theme of 
investigation the uncovering of the sources of the partial disagreements 
which would never come to the attention of the disputants because of their 
preoccupation with the subject-matter that is the immediate issue of the 
debate (281). 
 
Mannheim’s analysis of how people overlook underlying issues is important because 
sociologists are often accused of “side stepping” or avoiding real arguments. Mannheim 
argues that when there is a “fundamental misunderstanding” it is necessary to address the 
differences in the thought communities’ perspectives (281). Addressing the differences in 
the thought communities means setting aside the direct subject matter and looking at the 
framework or underlying points of contention.  
The objective of this research is to conceptually and descriptively analyze current 
definitions and classifications of sexual orientation in academic journal articles pertaining 
to the natural and social sciences from a cognitive sociological perspective. The purpose 
of this research project is to identify how natural, social, and empty kinds thought 
communities are classifying/defining sexual orientations in their work and to investigate 
6  
how these definitions/classifications are functioning within these debates.  This project is 
sociologically important because the definitions in research currently published reveal the 
ways in which people are conceptualizing sexual orientation and structuring the world. 
The implications of these structures are tied to politics, social policies, legal issues, and 
ethics. Conceptual and descriptive analysis of these definitions is relevant to many 
debates occurring in the field of sexuality. 
 
Theoretical Underpinnings 
 
 
Introduction 
 
 
The debates over how to define and classify sexual orientation is largely being 
represented as the debate between essentialists and social constructionists. Viewing the 
debate from this general position is problematic because it fails to capture the underlying 
debate between realism/nominalism and often lacks a common ground or compatible 
definition from which to argue. Mannheim urges researchers to untangle debates in order 
to get to the primary issues. “Going behind the assertions of the opponents and 
disregarding the actual arguments is legitimate in certain cases, namely, wherever, 
because of the absence of a common basis of thought, there is no common problem” 
(281).  A comprehensive discussion of past debates in these areas of philosophy and 
sociology are necessary to understand all the complexities and implications that various 
theoretical definitions entail. The discussion of this debate is intended to help clarify 
some of the issues surrounding sexual orientation, locate productive fields for debate, and 
discuss how these issues effect social policy. The theoretical analysis is divided into six 
sections:  
7  
• Arguments for Essentialism 
• Social Construction 
• Arguments for Social Construction 
• Nature vs. Nurture 
• The Essentialist vs. Social Constructionist Debate 
• Thought Communities 
 
 
Arguments for Essentialism 
 
 
In the essentialist vs. constructionist debate, the essentialist position holds that 
sexual orientations are natural kinds, whereas the social constructionist position claims 
that they are either social or empty kinds. Essentialists and social constructionists are 
predominantly arguing over whether or not sexual orientations function according to 
scientific laws and explanations. Stein argues that “understanding this debate is a 
necessary precondition for answering metaphysical, scientific, and ethical questions 
about sexual orientation” (114). In order to clarify the debate between essentialism and 
social construction, as well as other internal debates, Stein breaks the two sides down and 
individually analyzes the arguments that are being posed.  Breaking down these 
arguments is important because it provides information and criteria for how each thought 
community is conceptualizing and/or classifying people based on sexual characteristics. 
In Stein’s analysis of essentialist arguments, he points out that there are three 
main arguments that essentialists use to claim that something is a natural kind: argument 
from involuntariness, argument from cultural universality, and the argument from 
ubiquity of sex drive. The argument from involuntariness tries to establish the proof of 
essentialism by showing that all people across different cultures view their sexual 
orientation as not being a choice or determined. This argument refers to people that say 
they were born hetero/homosexual and that it was not a choice and will not change. Stein 
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argues that if there were some genetic factor found in these people then sexual orientation 
would be a natural kind, but not by them simply stating that this is the case. Stein argues, 
“People are not reliable at discovering the source of something as complex as their own 
sexual disposition simply through introspection. Just because you think that your sexual 
orientation was not a choice…does not mean that it is so” (111). Stein says that it is a 
mistake to make generalizations about what some people say in one culture and to apply 
it to another culture. Whether or not sexual orientation is determined or a choice is not a 
settled matter in the United States, as it is probably not in various other cultures. The 
argument from involuntariness is not a good argument because it makes such broad 
generalizations about a limited amount of human introspections and does not prove that 
sexual orientations are natural kinds.  
 The argument from cultural universality says that if sexual orientations are not 
natural kinds, then it must just be a coincidence that there have been such a limited 
amount of sexual expressions in various cultures. Essentialists argue that the odds of 
various past and present cultures with people that desire the same-sex being a 
coincidence are too enormous. Steven Epstein (1987) argues, “Each society seems to 
have a limited range of potential storylines for its sexual scripts—and constructionists 
have surprisingly little to say about how that limiting process takes place” (260).  Stein 
argues that the reason people are able to group people so broadly in this way is because 
they are using the behavioralist perspectives and definitions of sexual orientation.  
Behavioralist definitions tend to either incorrectly group people into a category of 
sexual orientation or to leave them out completely, which is why definitions become so 
important to theories of sexuality and sexual orientation. Behavioralist definitions focus 
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on a particular behavior and categorize a person into a group based on that behavior. In 
this instance, a person is a homosexual if he or she engages in sexual acts with somebody 
else of the same-sex. This definition could be problematic because it defines people, such 
as male prisoners, as homosexuals even though they may desire women and only be 
engaging in same-sex behavior out of availability. This definition also categorizes 
lesbians as heterosexual, when they may be having sex with men for procreative 
purposes. It also makes it necessary for a person to have had sex in order to have a sexual 
orientation and does not include people who may desire the same-sex but who engage in 
sexual activity with the opposite sex. Stein argues that showing sexual orientation in 
behavioralist terms does not prove that sexual orientations are natural kinds.  
The final argument is the argument from the ubiquity of sex drive. This argument 
attempts to place the ‘drive’ to have sex with the ‘drive’ to eat, sleep, or any other 
biological based activity. Stein argues that even if the drive to have sex does turn out to 
be biological, this does not entail that sexual orientations are natural kinds.  “This does 
not in anyway establish that sexual orientation is a natural human kind anymore than it 
establishes that being attracted primarily to people with red hair is a natural kind” (114).  
Stein argues that scientists who claim that biologically based sex drives results in sexual 
orientations being essential are missing the point. Stein argues that the important point 
being overlooked is that the issue is not about whether or not the sex drive is biological, 
rather, the question is whether or not natural human kinds have something to do with a 
person’s preference to have sex with a particular sex/gender. Similarly, the question is  
10  
not about whether or not the drive to eat is biological, rather, it is about a person’s 
preference for a particular type of food to satisfy this need.  
 
Social Construction 
 
 
Social construction is difficult to define because of the many internal debates 
amongst social constructionist researchers. John Boswell (1992) argues, “There are 
probably as many ways to define ‘constructionism’ as there are ‘constructionists” (135). 
A basic platform that constructionists share is that at least some social constructs (games, 
money, language, and government) are the result of human social interaction and not a 
result of the laws of nature. Haslanger (1995) argues, “Something is a social construction 
in the generic sense just in case it is an intended or unintended product of social practice” 
(96).  Haslanger says that if one adopts this broad definition of social construction; nearly 
(if not) everything in the physical/social world is socially constructed. Haslanger 
references washing machines and power drills as being some of the intended social 
products and natural language as an unintended product of social practices. 
Haslanger refers to social construction as a “debunking project” because the goal 
for constructionists is “to distinguish social kinds from physical kinds” (20). Haslanger 
argues that a first step for constructionists is to point out that a particular category is 
“social” as opposed to “physical” (21). Haslanger points out that this is an important step 
because social kinds are not always obviously social. She argues that social  
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constructionists often strive for the surprising thesis that something most people assume 
to be a natural kind is actually a social kind (19).   
Hacking offers an explanation as to what social constructionist projects are 
attempting to do and why there is some confusion within these projects. Hacking argues 
that social constructionists tend to hold that: 
(1) X need not have existed, or need not be at all as it is. X, or X as it is at 
present, is not determined by the nature of things; it is not inevitable.  
Very often they go further, and urge that: 
(2) X is quite bad as it is. 
(3) We would be much better off if X were done away with, or at least radically 
transformed (6). 
 
Hacking points out that social constructionist projects attempt to show how social 
forces are in some way making X appear to be natural and permanent. Once they have 
accomplished this, he argues that they often go further to point out that X is bad and 
should be changed because it is not an inevitable entity. 
Berger and Luckman’s (1966) explanation of social construction provides a 
critical analysis of the process occurring in Hacking’s first proposition of the social 
constructionist process. Berger and Luckman explain that the social construction of X is a 
dialectical process that is characterized by three components: externalization, 
objectivation, and internalization. Berger and Luckman argue that humans produce the 
social world or that the social world is the intended/unintended product of humans. 
Externalization refers to the objects and institutions that are external to humans. 
Objectivation occurs when humans begin to regard society and objects in society as 
“objective realities” (61). Berger and Luckman argue that reification is a crucial step in 
the process of objectivation. “Reification is the apprehension of the products of human 
activity as if they were something else than human products—such as facts of nature, 
12  
results of cosmic laws, or manifestations of divine will” (89). Berger and Luckman 
explain that the process of reification results in people forgetting their authorship or 
producer position in the world and regarding the world as a “strange facticity” that they 
have no control over (89). Internalization occurs when humans internalize these 
objectified or reified objects, thus becoming human products of the society they created.   
Hacking notes that there are two different projects going on in social construction, 
“idea construction” and “object construction.” These two projects, Hacking says, are 
often confused in social constructionist work. Haslanger points out that the construction 
of ideas is only possible within a social context. Hacking makes the distinction that 
objects are actually in the world whereas ideas are not. Haslanger points out that the 
construction of ideas is only possible within a social context. Hacking uses the example 
of paying rent to explain this. Borrowing some terms from John Searle, Hacking argues 
that “some of these items are ontologically subjective but epistemologically objective 
items. The rent you have to pay is all too objective…but requires human practices in 
order to exist” (22). He explains that paying rent is ontologically subjective because it 
would not exist without human social practices, although rent is epistemologically 
objective because a certain amount of money is due every month. In regards to sexual 
orientation, some may argue that heterosexuals and homosexuals are ontologically 
subjective because certain social historical situations have encouraged people to classify 
and consider one’s sex/gender and his or her partner’s sex/gender important. It is 
epistemologically objective because these are people who can be counted and classified.  
13  
Haslanger and Hacking both agree that social constructionists need to clarify this point 
when doing research projects. 
Haslanger critiques Hacking for discussing and basing social construction as only 
being a causal process. Haslanger (2003) warns that, “we should be careful to distinguish 
different ways in which things are constructed, in particular, different ways things might 
‘depend for their existence’ on a social context” (316). Haslanger suggests that there are 
four ways for something to be socially constructed.  Haslanger uses the example of 
gender to show how something can be socially constructed in these different ways. The 
way that Hacking focuses on, is causal construction. Haslanger argues that “X is socially 
constructed causally as an F iff
4
 social factors (i.e., X’s participation in a social matrix) 
play a significant role in causing X to have those features by virtue of which it counts as 
an F” (317). She explains that X’s gender traits (men/masculine and women/feminine) 
are socially constructed if and only if social factors such as childhood upbringing, 
popular fashions, and family values (for example) play a significant role in causing 
gender traits to have those features by which it counts as a gender trait.  
The second way for something to be socially constructed is through what 
Haslanger (1995) calls constitutive construction. “Something is constitutively constructed 
iff in defining it we must make reference to social factors” (98). By something being 
constitutively constructed, the X in question is defined by referring to other social X’s. 
Keeping with the example of gender traits, this means that gender traits are constitutively  
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 Iff: if and only if. 
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constructed if and only if in our definition of gender traits we make reference to social 
factors such as beauty rituals, division of labor, education, and other various factors.  
Haslanger argues that the purpose of discussing these two different ways of being 
constructed is “to note…that our classificatory schemes, at least in social contexts, may 
do more than just map preexisting groups of individuals; rather our attributions have the 
power to both establish and reinforce groupings which may eventually come to fit the 
classifications” (99).
5
 Haslanger calls this third type discursive construction because of 
the potential of X being the way it is, at least to some extent, due to what has been 
attributed to it. Discursive construction is closely related to Hacking’s explanation of 
interactive kinds and many of the labeling theorist’s interpretation of construction.  
The fourth type of construction that Haslanger (1995) identifies is pragmatic 
construction. She argues that pragmatic construction is “a classificatory apparatus (be it a 
full-blown classification scheme or just a conceptual distinction or descriptive term) is 
socially constructed just in case its use is determined, at least in part, by social forces” 
(100). Haslanger argues that there is a weak and strong type of pragmatic construction. In 
the weak sense, something is pragmatically constructed if its use is only partly 
determined by social forces, whereas something is constructed pragmatically in the strong 
sense if its use is completely determined by social forces
6
.  
Haslanger (1995) argues that weak pragmatic constructions are compatible with 
“those terms’ and classifications’ capturing real facts and distinctions” (100). She argues 
that there are many facts about the world to be discovered. People discover different facts 
due, in large part, to their interests. These interests are to some degree conditioned by 
                                                 
5
 Note the implications this has for Hirschfeld’s study of the physical difference between homosexual men 
and women vs. heterosexual men and women. 
6
 This is another example of the distinction in social constructionist projects. 
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social facts. Haslanger argues that in the weak pragmatic sense our classificatory schemes 
are able to pick out facts about the world even though our interest has conditioned what 
facts we decide to investigate. In the strong pragmatic sense, our classificatory schemes 
are not picking out real facts about the world. “In cases of strong pragmatic construction, 
however, the attributions are, by hypothesis, not accurately capturing facts, though there 
is the illusion that they are” (100). Analyzing whether or not our classificatory schemes 
are weakly or strongly pragmatically constructed is important because it impacts what we 
take to be knowledge of the world. The difference between the weak and strong 
pragmatic construction are related to the difference between the social kinds thought 
community and the empty kinds thought community. The weak pragmatic constructionist 
position is used by the social kinds thought community, whereas; the strong pragmatic 
constructionist position is used by the empty kinds thought community.  
In the debate between social constructionists and essentialists, the social 
constructionists analyze social factors that may be ‘naturalized’
7
 in society and point out 
that something need not be the way it is and could be otherwise. Haslanger identifies 
three different ways that something can be socially constructed and the significance of 
the context in which something is socially constructed. Hacking argues that social 
constructionist projects tend to identify something that has been thought to be innate or 
inevitable and show that it is not determined by any scientific causal laws. Some social  
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 Naturalized, in this instance, refers to X appearing to be inevitable or governed by the laws of nature. 
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constructionists, as Hacking argues, go further and say that something is bad as it is in its 
current state and from there explains why it should be done a way with or transformed.  
 
Arguments for Social Construction 
 
 
In Stein’s (1999) analysis of social constructionist arguments, he argues that there 
are four different types of arguments that are being debated: argument from cultural 
variation, argument from different forms of desire, argument from anti-realism and 
argument from the simplicity of essentialism. These four arguments are tied together 
throughout social constructionists’ arguments in varying degrees. For the purposes of 
clarification, it is beneficial to examine each argument individually. Once each argument 
is understood separately, it is easier to recognize the problems that exist in the debates 
between social constructionists vs. essentialists and within social constructionists 
themselves. Each of the four arguments presents a different twist on the definition of 
sexual orientation.  
In the argument from cultural variation, Stein argues that some social 
constructionists “think that all they need to do to establish constructionism is to 
demonstrate that other cultures conceptualize human sexual desires in ways different 
from ours” (106). Stein also calls this argument the ‘no concept’ argument because what 
it comes down to is whether or not a culture has the same/different concept for X or no 
concept for X. Social constructionists often argue that if a culture does not have a concept 
for X, then they do not categorize or conceptualize things in the same way we do. This 
means that they have different ways or possibly no ways of thinking, speaking, and 
responding to X. In the instance of sexuality, some social constructionists may argue that 
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because no cultures before the nineteenth century had concepts for sexual orientation that 
there were no homo/hetero/bisexuals during that time and therefore sexual orientation is 
socially constructed (ergo, not a natural kind).  
Stein argues that just because there were no exact matches for contemporary 
concepts of sexual orientation in other cultures, it does not prove, therefore, that sexual 
orientation is a social kind and socially constructed. Stein uses the example of color 
blindness (physiological disorder) to establish this point. Colorblindness has only 
relatively recently been discovered and conceptualized. Stein argues that there were 
colorblind people or people that could not distinguish various colors before the nineteenth 
century, even though there were no concepts for this sort of person. Stein argues that 
“just showing that many other cultures did not have categories for a certain sort of person 
(a colorblind person or a homosexual) does not show that these concepts fail to pick out 
intrinsic properties, that they cannot be applied transculturally or that such concepts are 
not objective and about the world” (38). The argument fails, according to Stein, because 
many of our medical/biological concepts and categorizations do apply to people of the 
past even though the cultures did not have these concepts.  
The argument from different forms of life often is closely tied to the argument 
from cultural variation. This argument goes further than saying that different cultures 
have different ways of conceptualizing sex and sexual orientation. “Foucault-type social 
constructionists…argue that different cultures produce different forms of sexual desire 
and different types of people and this difference shows that essentialism is false” (Stein 
347). This argument is more compelling than the first argument because it appeals to 
other social sciences for proof of the drastic differences in sexual expression, behavior, 
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relationships, and experiences across various cultures. Boswell argues that most people, 
including essentialist would agree that different societies produce different people (135). 
Stein uses the example of epilepsy to illustrate the details of this argument. The 
constructions of epileptics and epilepsy have been conceptualized and treated differently 
in various cultures. Stein explains that societies in the Middle Ages thought that epilepsy 
was a form of demon possession. Some Native American cultures thought epileptics had 
special powers. Other cultures treat it as a medical disorder. Each of these different 
cultures constructs attitudes and institutions around the various views of epilepsy. In 
some of the cultures mentioned, it is regarded as divine and special and in others it is 
regarded as evil and treated as such. In a culture like ours, it is medicalized and treated as 
an illness. In each of these instances the person with epilepsy is reacting with the label 
that is being given. Stein argues, “even if societies conceive and construct epilepsy in 
quite different ways and, as a result, epileptics in different cultures conceptualize and 
experience epilepsy in different ways, an epileptic is still a natural kind. The different 
forms of life argument for construction fails” (107). Stein’s point in this argument is that 
constructionists cannot prove that X is a social kind and not a natural kind by showing 
that something’s meaning varies in different cultures.  
The argument from Anti-realism follows closely with where the last argument left 
off because of its relation to social or subjective meanings. Antirealists or nominalists 
world views are in opposition to realist’s world perspectives. Realists or as Hacking calls 
them, inherent structuralists, view the world as being structured in such a way that there 
are knowable and describable facts in nature. Hacking argues that in a realist perspective, 
“the facts are there, arranged as they are, no matter how we describe them” (83). Hacking 
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expresses his level of discomfort with the idea that facts can just come into being and 
cease being. He argues that facts exist ‘timelessly’ and are out there to be discovered
8
.   
Anti-realists or nominalists believe that there is no independent or objective 
reality. Hacking refers to nominalism as name-ism because the names of things are 
arbitrary and are only considered that way through social context or human intention.  
Some social constructionists are anti-realist and do believe that the only reality that we 
can perceive is our own reality composed of unique individual experiences. James 
Weinrich (1987) illustrates the nominalist perspective through geography. “They argue, 
geographically speaking, that ‘Nevada’ is a social construction; it exists only because our 
culture says it exists” (176). He places this in opposition to realists, who would say there 
is a reality that transcends the name given to it.   
When talking about the world, Hacking argues that the nominalists believe that 
the world has no underlying structure. The structure that we perceive to exist is merely a 
cultural representation. Poststructuralists are an example of theorists who fall on the 
antirealist side of the debate because they do not believe that there is a reality 
independent of cultural practices and, as their name suggests; there is no structure to the 
world. Sullivan argues, “Poststructuralist theorists like Foucault argue that there are no 
objective and universal truths, but that particular forms of knowledge, and the ways of 
being they engender, become ‘naturalized’, in culturally and historically specific ways” 
(39). Sullivan further explains that these theorists believe that subjects are not 
autonomous, unified, and/or “self-knowing” (41). These groups of theorists also reject 
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 Although there are many different aspects and degrees of realists, for purposes of this argument they 
believe that the world is structured and that facts exist in nature to be discovered. 
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identity politics on the grounds that they become naturalized through culture producing 
oppressive and restrictive systems of power.  
Queer theorists also argue that sexual orientations are empty kinds. Much of queer 
theorists work tends to reject the idea of classifying people as heterosexual or 
homosexual because there are no such types of people. The second hallmark of Arlene 
Stein and Kenneth Plummer’s (1996) description of queer theory indicate the rejection of 
identity politics and classifications. “Identities are always on uncertain ground, entailing 
displacements of identification and knowing” (134). Queer theorists, like post-
structuralists, hold that nothing exists outside of cultural practices and meanings. This 
means that queer theorist believe that ‘queer’ self-concepts are different for everyone. 
Because everyone has a different ‘reference point’ or different experiences and cultural 
meanings, nobody will be able to fully identify with anybody else; making a shared 
identity (by definition) impossible. In short, they believe that a personal self-concept is a 
subjective construction.  
Haslanger, Stein, and Hacking all tend to agree that extreme nominalism is 
problematic. Haslanger (1995) argues that “once we come to the claim that everything is 
socially constructed, it appears a short step to the conclusion that there is no reality 
independent of our practices or of our language and that ‘truth’ and ‘reality’ are only 
fictions employed by the dominant to mask their power” (96). Stein equates extreme 
nominalism or the argument from antirealism to trying to kill a fly with an atomic bomb. 
He argues that antirealist arguments lead to the radical conclusion that we cannot believe 
anything. “Belief that all assumptions are undefended, leads antirealist to the conclusion 
that nothing can be proven, that no one can justifiably believe anything, and further that 
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there are no objective truths” (108). Stein also argues that the anti-realist claim is self-
refuting because “anyone who claims that there are no absolute truths is open to a 
question about what sort of claim she is making” (109). If a person claims that there are 
no absolute truths, then he/she is making an absolute truth statement; which is self-
refuting. Haslanger and Stein both support social construction and believe that it is 
possible for social constructionists to believe that things are socially constructed without 
believing that there is no reality independent of cultural practice. Stein argues that social 
construction is only an interesting position if there is limited relativism involved (108). 
The final argument, the argument from the simplicity of essentialism, is the claim 
some social constructionists use because they believe that essentialists must be 
committed to essenceism. Stein states that essenceism is “the claim that the particular 
category has an essence and that having this essence constitutes a necessary and 
sufficient condition for membership in that category” (110). Stein argues that some 
essentialists do not believe in essenceism. Essentialists can believe that sexual orientation 
is a natural kind but that there is no ‘essence’ for sexual orientation. The example that 
Stein uses for essenceism is LeVay’s study of the size of INAH-3 region of the 
hypothalamus. In LeVay’s research, the size of this region of the hypothalamus is a 
necessary and sufficient condition for being either a homosexual or a heterosexual. The 
point that Stein stresses is that something (i.e. sexual orientation) can still be a natural 
kind because essentialist need not be committed to essenceism. The argument from  
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simplicity of essentialism is not valid because it assumes that sexual orientation is a 
social kind without considering other possible theories for sexual orientation.   
 
Nature vs. Nurture Debate 
 
 
An underlying argument present in some essentialist and social constructionist 
work is the debate between nature and nurture. Stein argues that the debate between 
essentialists and social constructionists is not the same thing as the Nature vs. Nurture 
debate. Stein argues that Nature vs. Nurture is a false dichotomy because no human trait 
is solely the result of genetics or solely the result of social forces. The main argument 
seems to be over the variance in degree to which something is influenced by genetic or 
social factors. Stein argues, “The simple connections commonly thought to hold between 
the nature of the categories of sexual orientation and the cause of sexual orientation do 
not in fact hold; essentialism does not entail nativism and environmentalism does not 
entail constructionism (103).” Stein explains that biological mothers are a natural kind by 
virtue of their genes allowing them to get pregnant, however; having these genes do not 
determine that a person will become a member of this group. Another example Stein uses 
to show that these debates are separate is to suppose that sexual orientations do have a 
social origin. Stein argues that if after the effects of the social forces, “a person has a 
naturalistically determinate sexual orientation and his or her brain instantiates a particular 
psychological state in virtue of which he or she is a heterosexual or a homosexual, then  
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certain scientific laws apply to this person” (102). Stein’s counterexamples demonstrate 
the difference between the two debates.  
Stein points out that both social constructionism and essentialism are empirical 
theses regarding the innateness of sexual orientation that must be addressed through 
empirical methods such as experiments and observations. Stein argues that “if nativism is 
true, then constructionism is false and essentialism is true…[and]…the truth of 
constructionism entails that nativism about sexual orientation is false; if sexual 
orientation is not a natural human kind, then it cannot be innate” (103). Stein points out 
that the empirical nature of these theses should not be surprising because in order for 
something to be labeled a natural kind it must have empirical evidence or scientific laws 
that make it a natural kind. Separating these two debates is important because as Stein 
points out something can be a natural kind without being innate, but something innate 
cannot be other than a natural kind
9
. 
 
The Essentialist and Social Constructionist Debate 
 
 
Stein uses the debate over the interpretation of Aristophanes’ speech in Plato’s 
Symposium as an example of what is going on in both social constructionist/essentialist 
and realist/nominalist arguments.  Examining the different ways these debates have 
occurred and are occurring are important to the ways we are currently thinking about and 
defining sexual orientation today. Analyzing these past arguments also helps to explain 
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 This discussion is being highlighted because some social constructionist arguments against essentialists 
are aimed solely at the innateness of sexual orientation. Although many essentialist project deal with 
isolating a gene or attempting to “prove” biological determinism, essentialist projects need not focus solely 
on this issue. Essentialist can argue that sexual orientation is not innate, but formed through psychological 
development. For example, brain structures are developed in various ways largely due to our environment 
Stein points out that if a brain becomes structured a certain way and is related to sexual preference, then it 
is being governed by the scientific laws; and therefore a natural kind.  
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the several complexities in defining sexual orientation. In the myth, there are three human 
sexes; male, female, and hermaphrodite (half female and half male). Each of the humans 
has two heads, four arms, and four legs. The gods thought that these creatures were too 
powerful, so Zeus split them apart. After having been split apart they desired to be with 
the separated half. 
Now all who are the men’s slice of the common genus…are lovers of 
women…all women of this genus prove to be lovers of men…And all 
women who are sliced off from woman hardly pay attention to men but 
are rather turned toward women…but all who are male slices pursue the 
males (Plato:253). 
 
The debate over Aristophanes’ speech addresses what Boswell calls the basic 
puzzle of human epistemology, which questions to what extent our abstractions of human 
thought and speech correspond to an objective reality and questions the accuracy of 
particular concepts and abstractions, such as gender and sexuality (139). The universal 
interpretation of Aristophanes’ speech follows a similar line of argumentation as the 
essentialist argument from cultural universality. The universalized interpretation holds 
that classifications such as heterosexual and homosexual can be applied to people in other 
cultures and to people trans-historically. The localized interpretation follows the lines of 
thought from the argument from cultural variation, argument from forms of life, and the 
argument from antirealism. It holds that our contemporary concepts 
(hetero/homo/bisexual) should not be applied to people in other cultures; past or present. 
 Localizers argue that same-sex acts in Ancient Greece were trans-generational 
and that an age difference does not play an important role in contemporary 
homosexuality, therefore the two conceptions are not the same.  Those from the 
universalized perspective argue that just because different social structures were 
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surrounding people in the past and not people in the present does not mean that they are 
two totally different things. Stein states that those arguing from the universalizing 
interpretation can argue that there were different theories surrounding pregnancy (i.e. 
how to get pregnant, what was happening inside the body, active and passive roles of 
eggs and sperm, etc) than there are in the present, but this does not mean that our 
category pregnant could not be applied to people in the past.  
 Boswell argues that this debate between essentialists and social constructionists 
over the trans-historical application of sexual taxonomies captures many of the semantic 
problems that make up the entire controversy. Social constructionists use as evidence for 
their position, the lack of concepts for sexual orientation and the trans-generational aspect 
of same-sex acts. Boswell argues that there are three problems with this line of thought: 
1) there may be reasons for the structure of a language other than its 
reflection of ‘objective reality; 
2)  modern terms for sexuality are not necessarily any more 
comprehensive or accurate about the present than ancient ones are for 
the past; 
3) Application of modern categories to the past, even if they do not match 
precisely, may be a useful strategy for determining the relationship 
between the two.  
 
Boswell and Stein both argue that simply by pointing out that a concept did not exist 
during a certain time does not mean that the phenomena did not exist. There were people 
in the past who were pregnant and/or colorblind even though there were no exact matches 
for these concepts during this time.  
Boswell points out that there is no word in the French language for the concept 
‘shallow’ and no word in Latin for ‘religion.’ In the first instance, he argues that just 
because there is no word for shallow, it does not mean that there is nothing shallow in 
France or that the French do not recognize the concept of shallow. Shallow is understood 
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by the negation of deep, which Boswell argues is a semantic accident. Boswell points out 
that the lack of a word for religion in Latin may be partly a semantic accident, but that it 
is also an issue regarding social reality.  
Boswell argues that there was no concept of religion in Rome like the concept of 
religion in contemporary use. He questions whether this means that there was no religion 
in Rome and whether or not historians have been misleading people by speaking of a 
Roman religion. Boswell argues, “Should some new word, free of the contaminants of 
modern concepts, be coined to characterize the veneration of Roman deities and the cult 
of Cybel? No. There was obviously religion. That Romans view it somewhat differently 
does not demonstrate that it was, in fact, a different entity” (143). In terms of sexual 
orientation, he argues that just because there was not a concept for the categorization of 
sexual interest that it does not follow that they did not notice these distinctions.   
That past societies have similar divisions of sexual interests is quite convincing 
evidence that these terms can be applied cross culturally and trans-historically. However, 
as Stein argued earlier, this does not prove that sexual orientations are natural kinds. Even 
stronger evidence for the similar division of sexual interests is in an example that Boswell 
uses to illustrate these categories of sexual interests. Boswell states that the sister-in-law 
of Louis XIV describes the men in the French courtyard in categories similar to our 
contemporary ones: “some prefer women, some like both men and women, some prefer 
men, some prefer children, and some have little interest in sex at all” (169). The argument 
over these categorizations is important not because it proves essentialism or social  
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construction, but because it emphasizes the importance of the definitions and theories 
from which each side is operating.  
The essentialist arguing from the perspective of trans-historical application or 
cultural universality are generally operating from a behavioralist definition. The 
essentialist are pointing out as evidence that people in the past, across cultures and 
presently have had or are having sex with people of the same sex/gender. Social 
constructionists recognize that people have had and continue to have sex with people of 
the same-sex/gender, but some would argue that it does not mean the same thing for 
people in the past as it does for people in contemporary society. Robert Padgug (1979) 
argues, “Homosexual’ and ‘heterosexual’ behavior may be universal; homosexual and 
heterosexual identity and consciousness are modern realities” (58). He argues that there 
are different social factors occurring in our contemporary society that is unique from 
cultures in the past and some cultures in the present. 
This type of social constructionist reasoning originated in the writings of 
Foucault. Foucault argues that in the nineteenth century the homosexual became a type of 
person. “The nineteenth century homosexual became a personage, a past, a case history, 
type of life, a life form, nothing that went into his total composition was unaffected by his 
sexuality” (17). In the past, the people who had sex with people without the intent of 
reproduction were called sodomites, which meant that both homosexuality and sex as 
pleasure were thought to be unnatural. Around the nineteenth century, there was a shift in 
ideology from viewing sex as just an act, to a person being defined as a type of person  
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based on the sex/gender of the person/people with which a person generally has sex or 
desires to have sex. 
The Foucauldian constructionists argue that it is not appropriate to apply our 
categories of sexual orientation to the past because cultures in the past did not think it 
possible to ‘have’ an orientation for sexual behavior. Arnold Davidson argues that sexual 
orientation or sexual identity was not possible for early Christians and people in Ancient 
Greece because sexual identity is a product of psychiatric style reasoning, which emerged 
in the later half of the nineteenth century. “Sexuality only became a possible object of 
psychological investigation, theorizing, and speculation because of a distinctive form of 
reasoning that had a historically specific origin” (98).  Psychiatric style reasoning is an 
example of this shift of thinking that occurred in the nineteenth century.  
Constructionists who argue that sexual orientation emerged in the nineteenth 
century often point out the general changes that were occurring during this time. Jonathan 
Ned Katz states, “The transformation of the family from producer to consumer unit 
resulted in a change in family members’ relation to their own bodies; from being an 
instrument primarily of work, the human body was integrated into a new economy, and 
began more commonly to be perceived as a means of consumption and pleasure” (69).  
During this time period, medical doctors and scientists gained more prestige and began to 
pose new theories of sexuality and as Davidson mentions a new psychiatric style of 
reasoning about sexuality.  
 Mary McIntosh (1968) argues that the shift from a sexual act having little 
influence on a person’s character to a sexual act defining one’s character, lead to negative 
stigmatizations of people who did not adhere to sexual norms.  McIntosh explains that 
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there are two ways that labeling a person as deviant operates. “In the first place it helps to 
provide a clear-cut, publicized and recognized threshold between permissible and 
impermissible behavior…Second, the labeling serves to segregate the deviants from 
others” (27). In this theory, the person labeled as a homosexual is stigmatized and this 
stigma separates the person from the “normal/heterosexual” society. The labeled person 
interacts with the label, which is what many social constructionists argue makes the 
contemporary homosexual so different from people engaging in same-sex acts in pre-
capitalist societies. The argument goes, that in pre-capitalist societies people responded 
negatively to the act of someone having sex with someone of the same-sex and not the 
person. In the nineteenth century, due to economic shifts and religious/scientific shifts, 
same-sex acts/desire became innate and biological. People in the past who may have 
desired the same-sex and did not act on it were considered acceptable, but after the 
nineteenth century this type of person received the innate label of being a “deviant” type 
of person. Through interacting with a label, this type of person emerged as a type of 
individual who could have never existed prior to the bourgeois society (Padgug 59). 
Boswell argues that the social constructionists who are arguing that homosexual 
identities did not exist before the nineteenth century are not giving a fair representation of 
their perspectives in a larger context. Boswell explains that if social constructionists 
arguing against the trans-historical application of homosexuality “would make clear that 
they also do not believe there is any such thing as a historical heterosexuality, family, 
kinship, state, government, or other such familiar abstractions, their audience would have 
a more realistic perception of their position” (139). Wayne Dynes (1988) also argues that 
the readers of this perspective are often left with the message that the abstraction of 
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sexuality is much different from that of other abstractions. Dynes argues that social 
constructionists are “selectively nominalistic” (231). He also argues that social 
constructionists mislead readers by making it seem as though there is a clear, accurate, 
and agreed upon contemporary concepts of homo/heterosexuality.  
Boswell argues that social constructionists are selectively choosing which things 
to deconstruct while leaving other things of a similar nature untouched. Boswell explains 
that there are other such labels, such as being Catholic, that are socially constructed, yet 
we continue to call people Catholic throughout history and in the present. “Being a 
Catholic in Rome in the 4
th
 century, when choosing to join the majority religion incurred 
the threat of death, was obviously fundamentally different from being a Catholic in the 
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th
 century, when failing to observe the official Catholic religion incurred the threat of 
death, and…being a Catholic in present day, where it is an ethnic heritage of little 
moment to many Italians” (145).  Boswell argues that in each of these cases the 
stigmatized label is acting differently (negatively, positively, and indifferent) for many 
Catholics, which means that in each case the person is responding differently. Boswell 
points out that there is not much difference between the Catholic and the Homosexual as 
far as labeling theory is concerned, but questions why people find it problematic not to 
call people who engaged in same-sex activity in the past homosexual since we have no 
problem calling Catholics in the past Catholic.  
The claim that people did or did not experience sexuality in similar or different 
ways has conflicting evidence for both sides. Stein and Boswell both argue that if 
essentialists are saying that there were similar desires in Ancient Greece or the Middle 
Ages, then they are ‘proceeding on faith.’ They also point out that constructionists are 
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doing the same thing by claiming that there were not similar desires. Boswell argues, 
“Since it is perfectly unclear what factors—social, psychological, genetic, etc produce 
varieties of sexual interest, no one can claim to ‘know’ that there were or were not such 
interests in the past” (148). Boswell argues that even from the forms of life argument it 
cannot be guaranteed that people back then did not feel desire in the same way as people 
do now.  
Hacking argues in a similar manner as Boswell, but along the lines of the 
argument from antirealism. Hacking calls the social constructionists claim that there were 
no homosexuals before the nineteenth century “making up people.” Hacking argues, “If 
there were some truth in the descriptions that I and others have furnished, then making up 
people would bear on one of the greatest traditional questions of philosophy, namely, the 
debate between nominalists and realists” (76). Hacking argues that there does seem to be 
some significance between what he calls two different vectors: expert’s labeling and the 
autonomous behavior of the person being labeled. He argues that concepts such as 
homosexuality and multiple personalities came into being hand in hand with the 
invention of their category. He argues that dynamic nominalism is the only form of 
nominalism that can account for this type of reification without ascribing to the claim that 
the only thing objects have in common is that we agree to call them by certain name.   
Hacking (1986) argues that ‘making up’ people is similar to the labeling theory 
because those people that are ‘made up’ are identifying with a particular identity. In this 
sense, we are all made up in some way or another. Hacking, as mentioned in a previous 
section, is a realist who expresses discomfort with facts coming into and out of existence. 
In this situation, he finds it a curious idea that types of people can come in and out of 
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existence. He makes the point that the homosexual of the nineteenth century may not 
even be accurate of what is out there right now.  
Hacking, earlier, organizes things under the categories epistemologically 
objective and ontologically subjective. In this instance it seems as though there is a 
tension between what exactly an epistemologically objective fact is and what exactly is 
ontologically subjective. An epistemologically objective fact is something that we can 
‘know’ about the world. Capturing some fact or description about the world, implies that 
some degree of realist thinking is involved. That people have had sex and continue to 
have sex with people of the same/different/both sexes is an epistemologically objective 
claim because we can point to empirical evidence to support it. This epistemologically 
objective fact is used as the basis for the behavioralist perspective of human sexuality. 
The behavioralist definition of a homosexual/heterosexual is based on the sex/gender of 
the people with whom a person has sex. This definition is what people who are arguing 
for the trans-historical application of sexual orientation are referring to when they say 
that people demonstrated and categorized others into similar taxonomies as we presently 
do, but did not have use of the exact language that we do.  If the acts of having sex with a 
certain sex/gender is all that is required to have a sexual orientation, then this perspective 
would be right in arguing that we should apply our uses of sexual orientation onto other 
cultures of the past and present.  
Another definition of sexual orientation that is used by both essentialists and 
social constructionists is the self-identification view. In this view, the existence of an 
epistemologically objective fact becomes less clear. The self-identification view allows 
research subjects to self-identify their sexual identity. Problems with this theoretical 
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perspective is that the researcher can take sexual orientation (classification of what is a 
homo/hetero/bisexual) to be something different than the subject. For example, a 
biologist may want to study heterosexual men to measure chemicals in the brain. If the 
biologist uses the self-identification model, it is likely that the biologist may end up with 
a variety of different people: men who are married to women but desire to be with men, 
men who have sex frequently with men but claim to be heterosexual, and men who have 
sex with men and women and who identify as heterosexual.
10
 In this instance, the results 
that the biologist obtains are going to be skewed because his/her subjects are operating 
from a definition that is different from that of the biologists’ behavioral assumptions 
about the definition of heterosexuality. Similarly, if a behavioral based researcher is 
studying self-identified homosexuals, it is likely that the results here will be skewed for 
the same reasons. Judith Lorber (1994) argues, “Assuming that all self-identified gay and 
lesbians have exclusively same-sex partners not only renders invisible the complexities of 
sexuality but can also have disastrous health outcomes” (432). The disparity in meaning 
between the researcher and the subjects makes using this method of research and 
definition highly problematic for obtaining accuracy.  
The self-identification view lacks an agreed upon definition of what a 
homo/heterosexual actually is. Being a homosexual seems to have something to do with 
attraction/desire/and/or sexual acts to or with a person of the same-sex/gender. Being a 
heterosexual seems to follow the same aspects as a homosexual but toward the opposite 
or other sex. The epistemologically objective aspect of sexual orientation only exists if 
either the researcher or the subject defines sexual orientation in behavioral act-based 
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 See book by J.L. King, Down Low. This book focuses on African-American men who have sex with 
other men and still self-identify as heterosexual and often have wives or girlfriends.  
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terms. If neither the researcher nor the subject is defining sexual orientation in this way, 
then there are no epistemologically objective facts.  
The dispositional perspective is another way of studying sexuality. This 
perspective combines the behavioralist and the self-identificationist aspects. Stein states, 
“According to this view, a person’s sexual orientation is based on his or her sexual 
desires and fantasies and the sexual behaviors he or she is disposed to engage in under 
ideal conditions” (45). This perspective emphasizes the distinction between the 
sex/gender a person is currently involved with and the sex/gender a person would be 
involved with under ideal circumstances. For example, someone in a rural area may be 
married to someone of the opposite/other-sex due to availability options or fear of 
exclusion from people in a community, but desire to be with someone of the same-sex 
under ideal circumstances. This theory also accounts for the counter example of men in 
prison. For example, men in prison may be having sex with other men and still call 
themselves heterosexual, because under ideal circumstances they would desire to have 
sex with women (Stein 210).  
The dispositional view does not have an epistemologically objective aspect 
because it dismisses acts as being a solely defining characteristic. This debate emphasizes 
the distinction of sex as an act from desire. That sex acts do not equal desire is a 
fundamental element in the debate over the trans-historical and cross-cultural application 
of sexual orientations between the essentialists and the social constructionists. It appears 
to come down to whether or not people in the past and in other cultures experience desire 
in the same ways and forms that people do in this society. As Stein and Boswell noted 
earlier, it is impossible for either side to claim that they ‘know’ that other societies 
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experience desire in the same ways as ours.  Desire based definitions do not necessarily 
lead to nominalism; however they do restrict sexual orientations to being time and 
culturally bound. Desire based definitions present sexual orientation as being social kinds 
because it is impossible to know if other cultures have thought and continue to think in 
the ways that this particular society does. In this sense, as Hacking says, people are ‘made 
up.’  
There is no epistemologically objective fact in the dispositional perspective 
because desire cannot be effectively measured. Because there is no epistemologically 
objective fact, homo/heterosexuals can go in and out of being. Hacking argues that facts 
are timeless and that the categories for sexual orientation are not defined in 
epistemologically object terms. This means that they are ontologically subjective. 
Hacking argues that because there is nothing epistemologically objective in this 
definition; sexual orientations cannot be anything other than socially constructed
11
. 
 
Thought Communities 
 
 
 An analysis of the essentialist vs. social constructionist debate reveals that there 
are more than two dominant standpoints. There are three dominant positions within this 
debate that become overlooked and are responsible for misguided debates. The natural, 
social and empty kinds thought communities are all active positions within this debate. 
The empty kinds thought community or nominalist social constructionist perspective is 
the less hidden standpoint within this debate. Stein and Haslanger both point out that this 
is a position being argued by social constructionists. Essentialists who try to argue against 
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 This is assuming that no biological component for desire has been found. There is no concrete scientific 
evidence at this time that a biological component for desiring a particular sex/gender has been found.  
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social construction based on nominalism and social constructionists arguing essentialist 
from a nominalistic perspective are unable to debate because they do not share a common 
problem. The natural kinds thought community is able to debate with the social kinds 
thought community over the structure of sexual orientation because they both agree that 
classifications of sexual orientation exist in society, but disagree about the epistemic 
criteria for classifying a person into a particular category. The empty kinds thought 
community is unable to debate with the other two thought communities because they 
deny the structural grounds for the debate. 
 The cognitive sociological acts of attending, perceiving and categorizing are 
related to the underlying problems the natural and social kinds’ thought communities 
have with defining distinct sexual categories such as heterosexual, homosexual, and 
bisexual
12
. The empty kinds thought community is not being discussed with the natural 
and social kinds thought communities because it does not adhere to an objective reality or 
structural foundation. A discussion on empty kinds will occur after the cognitive 
sociological analysis of the social and natural kinds thought communities.  
Both the natural and social kinds thought communities are influenced by what is 
considered to be relevant/irrelevant or marked/unmarked. Zerubavel argues, “In helping 
separate the relevant from the irrelevant, it is essentially our mental horizons that enable 
us to ignore certain parts of reality as mere background and thereby grasp (visually as 
well as mentally) any ‘thing’ at all” (36). In the natural sciences as well as the social 
                                                 
12
 Zerubavel identifies six cognitive acts: attending, perceiving, classifying, assigning meaning, 
remembering and reckoning time (1997:21). I have chosen only to focus on the first three because they all 
directly deal with aspects related to the process of creating definitions. For example, it is necessary that the 
researcher focus on some things as relevant vs. irrelevant and perceive characteristics in a certain way in 
order to classify things into definitions. The other three cognitive acts are relevant, but not in the same 
direct way as the first three.  
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sciences, the sex-gender that an individual engages, or desires to engage, in a relationship 
with is considered relevant. 
 Society tends to focus on the relevant or “marked” groups of individuals, such as 
homosexuals. Wayne Brekhus (1998) argues that marked people are the objects of focus. 
He further argues, “…the marking process exaggerates the importance and 
distinctiveness of the marked” (36). Brekhus argues that distinctions made among the 
marked are often ignored, while characteristics of particularly marked individuals are 
generalized to other marked individuals. This aspect of being marked by sexual 
orientation has epistemological and methodological implications for the specific or vague 
sexual characteristics by which people are organized.  
Brekhus argues that even the decision to limit sexual orientation to a particular 
sex/gender does not capture the full range of what a sexual orientation could be. 
“Although present use of the term ‘sexual orientation’ implies that gender is the sole 
criterion upon which people’s sexual preferences rest, many people also select or exclude 
sexual partners based on their weight, race, age, species, and other traits” (1996: 498). 
Stein also argues that sexual orientations are arbitrary classifications for marking or 
leaving individuals unmarked and that there are several other ways in which sexual 
orientations could be classified. However, as Stein points out, society finds these 
attributes irrelevant when defining a sexual orientation and considers the sex-gender of 
individuals as being relevant. Stein critically asks, “Why include only a narrow range of 
sexual interests? Why focus on this feature of a person’s sexual desire as the crucial one” 
(66)? For the social kinds thought community, these questions represent the debunking of 
the reification of sexual orientations and helps problematize the ways in which people are 
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focusing on sexual orientation. The natural kinds thought community tends to agree that 
the focus on a person’s sexual orientation is largely social, however; they still maintain 
that a person’s sexual orientation is a biological matter. It is compatible for the natural 
kinds thought communities to maintain that social forces shape people’s focus and 
perception of sexual orientation without believing that sexual orientations are social 
constructions themselves. 
Zerubavel argues that the ways in which people perceive the world are largely 
influenced by the people around them in their social environment. Zerubavel argues, 
“Our social environment plays a major role in how we actually interpret things. The way 
we mentally process what we perceive through our senses is to a large extent socially 
mediated” (24). Zerubavel goes on to explain that when people experience something for 
the first time, they try to fit the new object into a pre-existing cognitive schema. The 
social and natural kinds thought communities are both influenced by the social 
environment. In the general society, heterosexuals are considered to be normal, legal, and 
good citizens. Homosexuals are often perceived to be abnormal or sick, in some cases 
illegal, and deviant citizens. In other words, heterosexuals are perceived positively, 
whereas homosexuals are perceived negatively.  
The perception of the social kinds thought community is clearly and directly 
influenced by the surrounding social environments. The perception of the natural kinds 
thought community, although not as clearly, is also heavily influenced by the social 
environment. Zerubavel argues, “Even seemingly objective scientific ‘facts,’ in other 
words, are affected by the particular mental filters through which scientists process what 
they observe in their heads” (25). Zerubavel argues that shifts in perceptions or shifts in 
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“mental gazes” are responsible for many scientific discoveries. The natural kinds thought 
community agrees that social factors influence the subjects being researched, while still 
maintaining that ‘seemingly objective scientific facts’ operate or are governed by the 
laws of nature. The positive or negative perceptions of people considered to be 
heterosexual/bisexual/homosexual are important because it influences the type of 
research being done within the thought communities. 
The cognitive sociological act of classifying is a primary focus for sexuality 
scholars because definitions pertaining to sexual orientation often vary among researchers 
and their particular thought communities. Mannheim argues that in order to be considered 
knowledge, “every perception is and must be ordered and organized into categories” (86).  
Nippert-Eng (1995) argues that classificatory boundaries are the “most essential element 
of culture” because they shape thoughts and actions. Nippert-Eng also points out that 
classificatory boundaries “are the girders supporting all interpretation, all experience. By 
internalizing certain combinations of specific borders, we perpetuate a distinct, cultured 
way of thinking…the definitive aspect of social group membership” (xi). In other words, 
society not only influences how individuals attend/focus and perceive sexual orientation, 
but also how these perceptions are then mentally organized or categorized.  
Zerubavel (1991) points out that people create islands of meaning through the 
processes of lumping and splitting information within existing cognitive schemas. These 
existing cognitive schemas are shaped and reshaped through interactions with people in 
the same thought communities as well as through other factors in the social environment. 
Zerubavel argues that the process of lumping specifically downplays the differences 
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between two entities, whereas the splitting process widens the perceived gap between two 
entities or islands of meaning (27).  
Zerubavel (1991) explains that in order to categorize distinct information it is 
important to separate “meaningful entities” from one another. “Separating one island of 
meaning from another entails the introduction of some mental void between them. As we 
carve discrete mental chunks out of continuous streams of experience, we normally 
visualize substantial gaps separating them from one another” (21). Large voids between 
two islands of meaning are perceived to be even greater in depth and magnitude. 
Zerubavel explains that the ability to cognitively perceive the magnitude between two 
islands of meaning allows individuals to organize people into an “us” versus “them” 
dichotomy (27). Both social and natural kinds thought communities would agree that 
society, in general, categorizes homosexuals and heterosexuals into islands of meaning 
separated by a perceptually large void.  Both would also agree that society in general 
perceives and categorizes sexual orientation in the terms of the “us” versus “them” 
dichotomy.  
The difference between the social and natural kinds thought communities arises 
within the mental processes of “lumping” and “splitting” various characteristics regarded 
as being important for the classification of people into certain sexual categories. 
Zerubavel argues (1997) that different cultures and thought communities “carve different 
archipelagos of meaning out of the same reality; they very often also promote altogether 
different ‘styles’ of cutting up the world” (56). Zerubavel further explains that some  
41  
cultures and thought communities’ classifications are considered rigid, while other 
thought communities’ classifications are considered to be more fluid.  
Zerubavel explains that rigid boundaries are often viewed in terms of either/or and 
are largely based on Western logic. Natural kinds thought communities operate largely 
from an either/or perspective, arguing that sexual orientations are either governed by the 
laws of nature or they are not governed by the laws of nature. Natural kinds thought 
communities classify sexual orientation in rigid behavioral terms because these 
communities are concerned with epistemic justification and truth. Behavioralist 
definitions, as the title implies, focus on a behavior and categorize a person into a group 
based on that behavior. The natural kinds thought community organizes its classifications 
according to the behavioralist perspective’s framework because this thought community 
seeks to discover whether or not action-based sexual classifications are guided by 
biologically innate traits. The natural kinds thought community classifies people 
according to the sex-gender a person is sexually active with the majority of the time. 
Although some behavioral definitions are more complex, this is a general model used 
within natural kinds thought communities. 
Fluid boundaries are characterized as being blurry lines between two entities. 
Most social kinds thought communities operate with fluid boundaries because they are 
concerned primarily with sexual orientations being classified as relevant categories based 
on human intention or appropriation, instead of being concerned with the underlying 
structure in nature.  The social kinds thought communities are able to incorporate a more 
detailed and fluid categorization of sexual orientation because this thought community 
operates from the perspective that sexual orientation is a human made product that has 
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been reified to appear natural. The social kinds thought community can go beyond 
behavioral definitions to include desire, attraction, and use the loose term ‘relationship’ 
because they perceive sexual orientations to be islands of meaning with wide bridges 
going back and forth between the islands. The natural kinds thought communities cement 
categories of sexual orientation and provide no bridges between the heterosexual and 
homosexual islands of meaning. Most social kinds thought communities allow fluidity 
between the islands to occur and for them to be in a constant state of change.  
The natural and social kinds thought communities are both attempting to classify 
sexual orientations within a structured objective reality, however; they are unable to 
formulate an agreement on the classification of sexual orientations within the structural 
framework. The definition or classification of sexual orientation preferred by each 
thought community is not neutral. Stein argues that scientific research programs cannot 
make a good case for the biological determinism of sexual orientation when they are 
defining sexual orientation in essentialist terms. Stein argues that for a study to establish 
its claim, it needs to be able to produce results other than the intended results of the thesis 
(203). Ian Hacking (1999) argues that social constructionist projects do a similar thing 
when they define concepts in terms of their socially constructed properties. 
The empty kinds thought community conceptualizes sexuality in a different way 
than both natural and social kinds thought communities. The empty kinds thought 
community does not adhere to structure or identity, which means that they refuse to label 
people according to sexually based characteristics. Lynn Carr (1999) describes the empty 
kinds thought community as having a “fuzzy world view [because] categorization itself is 
the enemy …These…non-classifiers not only defy but claim to have transcended both 
43  
sexual categorization and the gender constructions that provide its foundation” (8-9). The 
empty kinds thought community lacks a common ground with the other two thought 
communities because it is against the perspective of the thought community to provide a 
definition or classification as a starting point for debate.  
Queer theorists, in particular, argue that there are no fundamental characteristics 
or definitive qualities for marking these individuals as a collective group. Shannon 
Winnubst (2005) explains, “If queer is that which dare not be defined, we are 
immediately on some strange terrain in the very attempts to speak of it. We need to attune 
ourselves to the meanings and implications of this ‘aggressive impulse of generalization” 
(135). The empty kinds’ thought community does not have a clear starting point because 
it appears to be unable to have a unified focus or way of perceiving and classifying 
information.  
 
Literature Review 
 
 
Analyzing definitions of sexual orientation is important for sociology in two 
ways; definitions shape methodologies for both empirical and non-empirical research 
programs and these various definitions are embedded in political ideologies. Kienzle 
argues, “In brief, the definition of a sociological problem and the methodology used to 
study it involve philosophical assumptions, making philosophy relevant to the working 
scientist (413).” The definitions of sexual orientation from each of the thought  
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communities are sociologically important because they are relevant to understanding the 
social/political origin, history, and current applications of sexual orientation. 
Scientific research on sexuality originated in the nineteenth century. Sex 
researchers during this time period classified sexual human acts and attributed medical 
pathologies to people who behaved in sexually “deviant” ways. Foucault (1978) argues 
that the nineteenth century Victorians were not sexually repressed; rather they were 
obsessed with classifying and labeling different types of deviance. Foucault argues that 
medicine began to change the ways people conceptualized sexuality, “…it carefully 
classified all forms of related pleasures; it incorporated them into the notions of 
‘development’ and instinctual ‘disturbances’; and it undertook to manage them (15).” 
Sexuality became more scrutinized during this time period because sexual acts became 
equated with a person’s innate individual character, rather than just merely being an 
action. Whereas people who engaged in same-sex activity before this era were only 
viewed as committing a sexual sin, people who engaged in same-sex activity during the 
Victorian era were viewed as sinners; their sin being an innate character flaw. Because of 
this ideological shift, many people who engaged in same-sex activity were criminalized 
along with other people labeled sexually “deviant” during the Victorian era.  
In the early studies of sexual orientation, scientists took a natural kinds approach 
and defined sexual orientations as something found in nature. The agenda for some of 
these early scientists was to argue that people who engaged in same-sex behavior should 
not be criminalized or punished for their behavior. They believed that if homosexuality 
was a result of nature and not a choice, then it could not be deemed unnatural and 
therefore not punishable by the law. The early sex research is largely based on 
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homosexual males. Early laws regarding same-sex relationships were geared specifically 
towards men because they were viewed to be sexual and active, whereas women’s 
sexuality was originally tied to reproduction and viewed as passive. The definition 
regarding sex during this time implied a “spilling of seed,” which is characterized as a 
male function (Emilio & Freedman 1997; 120-130). 
Magnus Hirschfeld was a medical doctor and early gay rights activist. He 
believed that doing research on homosexuality could combat the negative stereotypes 
being promoted by various religious groups. Hirschfeld argued for sexual pluralism or a 
variability of sex. He organized social and gay rights groups to educate the public in hope 
that his theories regarding homosexuality would change some of these deep rooted 
prejudices.  Because of Hirschfeld’s strong medical and scientific background, he 
searched for a biological component to sexuality.  
Hirschfeld’s study on the physical difference between heterosexuals and 
homosexuals indicates a biologically determined definition of what it is to be a 
homosexual or a heterosexual. Hirschfeld’s definition of homosexual or his conception of 
what it is to be a homosexual creates a problem in the methods section of his project. 
Hirschfeld’s definition of sexual orientation is strongly influenced by the popular 
inversion theory, which leads him to obtain subjects who may have only been thought to 
be homosexual based on a preconceived idea of what homosexual men and women look 
like. Stein argues, “Women with facial hair, deep voices, and muscular builds were more 
likely to be suspected of being a lesbian than women who lacked these attributes due to 
early thoughts about sexual inversion (128).” Stein continues to argue that the scrutiny 
over the sexual orientation of masculine women and feminine men may have lead some 
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of these people to doubt their sexuality because of their physical attributes and to consult  
doctors about it. Stein points out that during this time period most research subjects for 
these types of projects were people in clinical care, or were convicted criminals. Many 
people in the general population were not openly gay, therefore forcing sex researchers to 
analyze an unrepresentative sample.  
Richard von Krafft-Ebbing was an early sex scholar whose work influenced the 
medical domain. Krafft-Ebbing also argued that homosexuality was innate, but not in the 
same way as Ulrichs. He argued that homosexuality was congenital through heredity and 
degeneration. “Krafft-Ebbing believed that homosexuals were less developed, in an 
evolutionary sense, than heterosexuals; that, in short, they exemplified a more primitive 
state of being (Sullivan 7).  Krafft-Ebbing published Psychopathia Sexualis, which is a 
book of his attempts to classify and label all the forms of non-procreative sexual activity. 
The book was intended as a reference for doctors, but was used in court to counter the 
claim that homosexuality is a crime against nature. Krafft-Ebbing depicted 
homosexuality as not being a sin or a crime, but instead a disease. Although intended as a 
medical project, Krafft-Ebbing’s book also contributed to legal reform. Ruth Hubbard 
(1990) argues, “The definition served the purpose of the reformers (although the laws 
have been slow to change), but it turned same-sex love into a medical problem to be 
treated by doctors rather than punished by judges—an improvement, perhaps, but not 
acceptance or liberation (66).” 
Past researchers largely operated from the natural kinds thought community. 
Theories of the past researchers were predominantly biologically based and promoted the 
idea that heterosexuals and homosexuals were certain types of people due to the laws of 
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nature and not through social structures or institutions. The motivations of these 
particular sexologists seemed to challenge the claim that homosexual sex is ‘unnatural,’ 
by arguing from a theoretical standpoint that situates the origin of sexuality into the 
biological realm. Although these biological theories were a legal success in arguing for 
the decriminalization of homosexuality, they lend themselves to political and ethical 
interpretations regarding the elimination of homosexuality and the perception that 
homosexuals are defective or abnormal individuals. In regards to definitions of sexual 
orientation, the political significance is reflected in the ways that homosexuals are labeled 
as abnormal and treated as such.   
The ways in which we define and conceptualize sexual orientation is still 
important today because of the continuing social consequences these definitions have for 
socially marked groups, such as gays and lesbians. The government has been funding 
large research projects that seek to find a biological component for sexual orientations. 
“The human genome project, which started in 1990, is a multibillion-dollar, fifteen-year 
research project to identify which traits each piece of our genetic material codes for 
(Stein 141).” The amount of money being used to fund research projects that seek to 
discover a genetic component for sexual orientation is a political statement in that it 
emphasizes the value that the government is placing on the outcomes of these projects. 
The money used to fund this research has been evaluated and has been purposely 
allocated to programs studying sexual orientation. Stein argues that the history of science 
in regards to sexual orientation has not been positive. Stein argues, “Scientific research 
on sexual orientation has a gruesome history of being used to harm lesbians, gay men, 
and other sexual minorities (329).” Stein explains that many early scientific research 
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programs were aimed at eliminating homosexuality and involved electroshock therapy 
and several other dangerous methods.  
 The research being done on sexual orientation in the scientific fields has been 
largely unsuccessful. Stein argues that these studies have not been successful because 
“studies in the emerging scientific program—embrace explicitly or implicitly—a 
problematic account of what sexual orientation is; have problems finding an appropriate 
subject pool to study…and make a variety of implicit, widely varied and unjustified 
assumptions about homosexuality (226).” Stein makes the point that definitions within 
the scientific field of research vary depending on the research being done. Stein argues 
that research programs cannot make a good case for the biological determinism of sexual 
orientation when they are defining sexual orientation in essentialist terms. Stein argues 
that for a study to establish its claim, it needs to be able to produce results other than the 
intended results of the thesis (203). 
 Scientific research does not always explain what definition of sexual orientation is 
operating in a particular study. Stein argues,  
It is crucial for scientific research on sexual orientation to carefully define 
its object of study in order to divide people into sexual orientations in a 
reasonable fashion and in ways that do not skew the results. A study of 
sexual orientation must start with some (at least implicit) definition of 
sexual orientation: who will count as a homosexual/heterosexual? (195)  
 
Stein suggests that when a biological research project does not provide a definition of 
sexual orientation, to look at the methods section and see how the researcher is assigning 
people as heterosexuals and homosexuals. Research projects on sexuality have the 
capability of providing both positive and negative effects for homosexuals. Stein argues 
that science has had a negative record for producing positive political policies. Stein 
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explains that even well intentioned research can have negative effects. An example that 
Stein provides to explain this is Hirschfeld’s regret that he promoted a biological view for 
sexual orientation. As mentioned before, Hirshfeld was originally a proponent of sexual 
orientations being innate in order to decriminalize homosexuality and prove that 
homosexuality was natural. Stein states that when Hirschfled was on his death bed said 
that he had unintentionally contributed to the persecution of homosexuals by giving them 
a biological stigma. Stein argues that one of the Germans’ reasons for killing the 
homosexuals was to get rid of the homosexual disease so that the German youth would 
not be exposed to it.  
 Social constructionist definitions of sexual orientation have often been used to 
show that sexual orientation is a product of our social environment. Although people may 
equate social construction with choosing one’s sexual orientation, this need not be the 
case. Social construction, by definition, implies a structuring and shaping of something, 
X, by social forces. A person’s social class, for example, is socially constructed and yet 
often thought not to be chosen. Social construction does not reduce to a choice. In fact, 
the definition seems to suggest that social structures and institutions are shaping concepts 
such as gender, sexual orientation, race, and class, rather than people choosing 
classifications within these concepts out of nowhere. For example, it is unlikely that I will 
wake up tomorrow and decide not to be my usual race, gender, sexual orientation, or 
class. It seems more likely that social structures shape each of these concepts making 
sudden choices like changing one’s sexuality more than a fleeting overnight thought. 
Another reason it seems more likely that social forces are constructing sexual orientation 
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is because of the fact that concepts like class, gender and sexual orientation are not 
necessarily permanent.    
 The two types of social construction have different political agendas and 
implications. The post-structuralists and queer theorists argue for the deconstruction and 
abandonment of classifications of sexual orientations. Adam Green (2002) argues, “In 
this vein, queer theorists object to the use of sexual classifications as a unit of analysis on 
epistemological and political grounds, and call for…a deconstruction of unified concepts 
of sexual identity and subjectivity (525).” Post-structuralists and queer theorists argue 
that sexological categories are too monolithic and fail to capture the complex 
relationships with gender, race, and class (Green 525).  
 The social constructionists who do use the sexological classifications argue that 
these classifications help to organize gays and lesbians to come together as political 
groups and help to create shared communities and support groups. They also argue that 
gays and lesbians often respond to these classifications because regardless of how they 
may envision themselves, these categories are what the general population use for 
classification. Green argues that sexological classifications have served and continue to 
serve/influence self-concepts for heterosexuals and homosexuals. He argues that these 
sexological definitions are important because people in our society recognize and respond 
to these classifications in both positive and negative ways. Green argues that regardless 
of how gays and lesbians self-identify, they know intuitively that they are part of a 
classification and that deconstructing these classifications are more harmful than helpful.  
The sociological importance of conducting a theoretical analysis of definitions of 
sexual orientation in the context of the debates between essentialism/social construction 
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and realism/nominalism is demonstrated through the many provided examples that relate 
theoretical definitions to social policies. Stein argues, “Metaphysical and scientific 
matters connect, albeit in complex and contested ways, to ethical, political, and legal 
matters. An understanding of human nature is (in some way) relevant to what we ought to 
do (ethics), how society ought to be structured (politics), and what our laws should be 
(legal) (6).” Kienzle argues, “Philosophical awareness may help us to see that existing 
controversies over the nature, scope and subject matter of sociology are fundamentally 
philosophical controversies (422).” Kienzle goes on to say that if more sociologists make 
themselves aware to the philosophical controversies that lie behind sociological subject 
matter; sociologists will ‘not only be less dogmatic’ but also more ‘cognizant of the 
course of the sociological future (422).’ Understanding the significance of the 
philosophical debates underlying the study of sexual orientation provides valuable insight 
into the way definitions and classifications function methodologically and politically. 
In summary, throughout the various discussions of social constructionism, it 
becomes apparent that there are two incongruent views of sexuality operating under the 
rubric of one perspective. As Haslanger mentioned before, one group of social 
constructionists operate from a weak pragmatic epistemological standpoint and the other 
from a strong pragmatic epistemological standpoint. This distinction is important because 
the weak pragmatic epistemological or social kinds thought community’s standpoint 
holds that there are certain things we can ‘know’ about the world, whereas the strong 
pragmatic or empty kinds thought community’s epistemological standpoint holds that we 
cannot ‘capture facts’ or know about the real world.  This buried debate within the social 
constructionist’s position has resulted in misguided debates. In order to be productively 
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arguing the social construction vs. essential debate it is important that all the people 
debating it be talking about the same thing. Hacking argues, “Since neither scientists nor 
constructionists dare to use the word metaphysics, it is not surprising that they talk past 
each other, since each is standing on metaphysical ground (61).” The lack of a well 
identified distinction between the two types of social construction has resulted in realist 
vs. anti-realist argument being argued in the background of the social constructionist 
position. 
These debates over the definitions and classifications of sexual orientation are 
important because they shape research projects in academia and the general public’s 
social attitudes. Stein urges that researchers in both the social and natural sciences 
develop definitions that do not automatically lend themselves to their intended theses. 
When the definitions for are “stacked” to inevitably result in an intended thesis, it results 
in a thought community talking amongst itself. The social constructionists need to be 
clearer about their exact positions, such as being a member of the social or empty kinds 
thought communities. As the analysis suggests, there are several occasions where 
essentialists critiqued the whole social constructionist position when they were really 
addressing the nominalist or empty kinds thought community’s stance. Essentialist or 
those operating from the natural kinds thought community also need to be aware that 
there is more than one position for social construction. Emphasizing these particular 
conflicts between the thought communities is intended to help resolve the “intellectual 
antagonisms” that Mannheim discusses.  
 A cognitive sociological perspective is not without bias; however it allows 
researchers to gain insight into the thought communities being studied. By analyzing how 
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the different thought communities attended, perceived, and classified aspects of sexual 
orientation; it became clear that each position had its own unique picture of the world. 
Each of these three perspectives (natural/social/empty) functions as narratives describing 
sexual orientation from different points of view. All three of the perspectives are 
asserting narratives about sexual orientation, but they are also asserting images of the 
how the world works. Natural kinds present the image that sexual orientations are 
governed by the laws of nature. Social kinds present the image that sexual orientations 
are shaped by social forces. Empty kinds present the image that everything is subjective 
with the illusion that there is an objective reality. As Zerubavel points out, cognitive 
sociology is not about finding which point of view is the right view or truth; rather it is 
about analyzing the different narratives regarding “crucial” personal aspects that people 
are using to define and categorize sexual orientations. 
 
Research Design 
 
 
 The objectives of this research project are to descriptively and conceptually 
analyze natural/social/empty thought communities’ definitions and classifications of 
sexual orientation in peer-reviewed academic journals in the natural and social sciences.  
This research design is qualitative; using a combination of standard content analysis and 
grounded theory methods. The cognitive sociological acts of attending, perceiving, and 
classifying will serve as guidelines for discovering the various authors’ definitions of 
sexual orientation in the articles. The definitions will be organized according to the 
thought community it is representing. For example, if a biologist is defining sexual 
orientation from an essentialist point of view; then I will point out what specific item of 
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sexual orientation the member of the natural kinds thought community is focusing on as 
relevant. I will also examine how rigid or fluid the categorizations of sexual orientation 
are in the definitions. Haslanger’s theoretical questions concerning concept analysis will 
also be used to analyze the definitions of sexual orientation. The research design is 
divided into four sections:  research questions, data collection, data analysis, and 
time/limitations. 
 
Research Questions 
 
 
 The research questions that I am going to be asking are centered on the 
descriptive nature of this project. “In descriptive research, the researcher begins with a 
well-defined subject and conducts research to describe it accurately. The outcome of a 
descriptive study is a detailed picture of the subject (Neuman 2003: 30).” The first set of 
questions is designed to center the focus of the open and axial coding on the definitions 
of sexual orientation in the research articles. In the first set, there are three general 
questions or group of questions applying to the definitions themselves that are going to be 
analyzed in the journal article data: what concept of sexual orientation is given, what 
(natural) kind (if any) does the epistemic vocabulary track, and what is the point of 
having a concept of sexual orientation? A second set of questions suggested by Nippert-
Eng (1995) are aimed at the uncovering the processes and techniques that the researchers 
are using in their definitions. Nippert-Eng suggests that it is important to ask what  
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‘strategies, principles/assumptions, and practices’ the researchers are using to ‘create, 
maintain, and modify cultural categories’ (7). 
 The purpose of the first question is to make the definition of sexual orientation as 
clear as possible in each journal article. “What concept of sexual orientation is being 
used?” This research question draws upon the methodological use of concept analysis. 
Stein argues that the idea behind concept analysis is that people in a society may have an 
intuitive sense of what a word means, but not have a definition of the actual word. Sexual 
orientation in past research has not been defined in a clear manner. Stein argues that the 
process of conceptual analysis “aims at making the meaning of a concept explicit. This 
involves trying to tease out a concept’s meaning by considering candidate definitions of it 
and seeing how they fit with our intuitive sense of the concept’s application (23).” 
Haslanger explains that this aspect of conceptual analysis is introspective.  
The cognitive sociological approach is important when analyzing the conceptual 
nature of definitions. When analyzing the definition provided, I will be looking at each 
researcher’s perception of what a sexual orientation actually is.  Although it seems that 
the perceptions of sexuality would be quite similar, Zerubavel explains that different 
thought communities might also have different “optical lenses.” “In other words, there is 
always more than only one cognitive standpoint from which something can be mentally 
approached. As a result, there is also more than just a single way in it can be ‘correctly’ 
perceived” (30).
13
 Another aspect important to the general definitions provided is to note 
and classify what each thought community regards as relevant and irrelevant. The most 
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 Zerubavel argues that this does not rule out the existence of an objective reality. “It does, however, tie the 
validity of the different ‘views’ of that reality to particular standpoints rather than to some absolute Truth” 
(30). 
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important element of analyzing the concepts provided in the articles is to evaluate the 
rigid or fluid categorizations being made in the categorizations of sexual orientations.  
 The second question focuses on the extension of the concept. “What kind if any 
does our epistemic vocabulary track?” Haslanger argues that this question does not 
necessarily have to be talking about biological or natural kinds, but can also be talking 
about social kinds. She argues that a descriptive project can inquire into social aspects 
such as what it is to be an American or a democracy. Haslanger (2000) explains that a 
project like this may begin “by considering the full range of what has counted as such to 
determine whether there is an underlying (possibly) social kind that explains the 
temptation to group the cases together (33).” The descriptive analysis in this research 
project is used to identify any possible kinds (natural/social/empty) that our definitions 
may be tracking.  
 Haslanger emphasizes the importance of looking at a large social matrix to see 
what things have been included into a group and what has not been included into a group. 
Haslanger argues, “The first task is to collect cases that emerge in different (and perhaps 
competing practices; then, as before, one should consider if the cases constitute a genuine 
type, and if so, what unifies the type” (17). In this instance, I will be looking at the recent 
journal definitions and tracking how they classify sexual orientation. I will be looking at 
the aspects of sexual orientation that are included into the group (hetero/homo/bisexual) 
and what aspects are not included within recent definitions of sexual orientation.   
 The third question type deals with a more political aspect of the definitions. 
“What is the point of having a concept of sexual orientation?” A follow up question that 
Haslanger suggests is, “What concept (if any) would do that work best (32)? Haslanger 
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calls this analysis an analytic or ameliorative analysis. In her most recent work, she uses 
the term ameliorative instead of analytic. “I’ve cast my inquiry as an analytical—or what 
I here call an ameliorative—project that seeks to identify what legitimate purposes we 
might have (if any) in categorizing people…and to develop concepts that would help us 
to achieve these ends” (11). The ameliorative project provides a way for me to analyze 
the political implications (if any) the definitions in the journal articles may have. 
Haslanger argues, “How we classify bodies can and does matter politically, for our laws, 
social institutions, and personal identities are profoundly linked to understandings of the 
body and its possibilities” (52). This question focuses on any definitions used directly for 
political purposes.  
 The set of question pertaining to the strategic processes of the researchers is 
useful not only for deconstructing the definitions or concepts, but also to see the 
importance of items deemed as relevant and irrelevant by the researchers. The first part of 
the question deals with the strategies, principles/assumptions, and practices the 
researchers are using in their conceptual categories. Strategies refer to the plan of action 
by the researcher to achieve their general definition. Principles or assumptions refer to 
beliefs that are guiding a particular researcher’s actions during the creation, maintenance, 
and modifications of their definition. Practice refers to the actual moment of defining the 
category by ‘lumping’ and ‘splitting’ different criteria from relevant to irrelevant. The 
second part of the question emphasizes the creation, maintenance, and modification of the 
researchers’ definitions.  Creation refers to the actual definition or concept being 
provided in the article. Maintenance refers to how the researcher is trying or not trying to 
make this definition or concept concrete or fluid. Modification refers to the definitions 
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ability to change either by being fundamentally altered or strengthened in its original 
form.   
 
Data Collection 
 
 
 The data that are being used in this research project are definitions of sexual 
orientation found in peer-reviewed academic journals. I obtained thirty-four articles from 
scholarly journals in the social and natural sciences.
14
 I used a variety of articles from 
different disciplines and journals for variety and theoretical saturation. I used the most 
recent articles available on Google Scholar’s advanced search in the Georgia State 
University electronic article database. Thirty-four articles are used in order to stay within 
a two year time period. The natural, social, and empty kinds thought communities are all 
influenced by time restrictions because the focal interests on various aspects for 
classifying sexual orientation are influenced by a variety of structures and/or social 
factors such as; political and/or religious climate, research funding and past research. The 
social and empty kinds thought communities maybe more influenced by the social 
structures or political climate of a particular society in their definitions. The natural kinds 
thought community must have recent definitions because politics and funding may shape 
focal biological and/or psychological criteria for inclusion into a particular sexual 
orientation. Another reason that the natural kinds thought community is more accurately  
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represented by the most recent articles is that current research is often based on 
duplications and finding from past research; thereby possibly changing definitions within 
a period of a few years.  
For example on Google Scholar, I have included articles only found electronically 
in the Georgia State University databases. An advanced search on Google Scholar was 
performed in order to narrow the amount of articles by setting parameters around the 
years of inclusion, disciplines, and word phrasing. Each article used in this study was 
published between the years of 2006 to 2007, in order to get the most recent definitions 
available. The disciplines of the academic journal articles are in biology, life sciences, 
environmental sciences, social sciences, arts, and humanities. The word-phrasing was 
used to narrow the articles by their titles. Each article has one or more of the following 
phrases in the title: homosexuality, heterosexuality, bisexuality, sexuality, gay, lesbian, 
and/or queer. The articles were presented in an apparently random order and were 
included into the study based on the above criteria and placement on the Google Scholar 
search results. The first articles to appear on the search results pages were the first 
included into the study, providing they had a Georgia State University electronic link 
with an available article attachment.  
 
Data Analysis 
 
 
 A standard content analysis and grounded theory are the methods of data analysis. 
A standard content analysis is used as an aid for providing some basic percentages for 
certain aspects of the articles. The percentages refer to the articles discipline and 
theoretical kind represented. These aspects of the research article helped aid in theoretical 
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saturation by revealing basic information regarding their position into one of the three 
thought communities. Although more basic article information was initially thought to be 
relevant, these three items provide the information needed for accumulating theoretical 
saturation in the grounded theory method analysis.
15
 
Procedures in grounded theory analysis can sometimes be ambiguous. Ralph 
LaRossa (2005) explains, “Given that details of the procedures can vary, it is imperative 
that GTM researchers be very specific about how they go about doing their analyses” 
(840). In this project, the data are analyzed in three stages: open coding, axial coding, and 
selective coding. In the beginning of the open coding phase, I conducted a micro-analysis 
of the definitions/conceptions regarding sexual orientation in the articles. I recorded 
memos indicating possible concepts, variables/categories, contexts and 
actions/interactions. The point of this process is to emphasize the importance of the 
authors’ choice of words and expressions. This is a lengthy task, but the results of a 
diligent word for word and line by line analysis proves to be beneficial at later points in 
the coding process (Corbin and Strauss 1998). 
 Corbin and Strauss state that “open coding is an analytic process through which 
concepts are identified and their properties and dimensions are discovered in data (101).” 
The open coding process requires that the researcher find common concepts so that the 
analysis can narrow in on these main areas. Corbin and Strauss say that when researchers 
are conceptualizing “we classify like with like and separate out that which we perceive as  
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dissimilar” (105). Next in the open coding process, I created variables/categories from 
my concepts.   
 The second stage of analysis is axial coding. The axial coding process functions to 
bring the focus back to the whole data that has been dissected in the open coding stage 
(Corbin and Strauss).  Axial coding also seeks to relate the categories with their 
subcategories in order to gain more precise explanations. Corbin and Strauss state that 
subcategories “answer questions about the phenomenon such as when, where, why, who, 
how, and with what consequences, thus giving the concept greater explanatory power 
(125).” Barney Glaser (1978) presents another method for axial coding by introducing the 
six C’s: “causes, contexts, contingencies, consequences, covariances, and conditions” 
(74). The focal category or variable is once again placed in the center as the focus for the 
theoretically coding of the six C’s method. Glaser also suggests that in addition to the six 
C’s, the researcher also code for process and pay attention to the strategies being used by 
individuals. (LaRossa 2005:847).  
Coding for process is where the theory is taken from its form as simply a structure 
and is applied to an action or a process. Corbin and Strauss state that “one is purposely 
looking at action/interaction and noting movement, sequence, and change as well as how 
it evolves (changes or remains the same) in response to changes in context or conditions 
(167).” The structure found in the research acts as the context in which the action takes 
place. In this stage, I am focusing on the action or how researchers are defining sexual  
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orientation and noting changes in how it is evolving (or remaining the same) in different 
contexts such as subject fields and past social matrixes.   
 The selective coding process is where the theory becomes clear and concise. This 
is the stage when a central category is chosen on the basis of its centrality and importance 
in the research. Corbin and Strauss suggest that diagrams be made of the categories in 
order to see more clearly the most central category (153). LaRossa argues that the 
grounded theory method is “designed to facilitate the crafting of stories” that are 
theoretical. Theoretical stories are “accounts of how a complex of variables are 
interrelated” (850). This research project uses this coding format to create a theoretical 
story or account of how researchers are classifying/defining sexual orientation.  
 
Results and Discussion 
 
 
Content Analysis 
 
 
The research consists of thirty-four journal articles focusing on sexuality and/or 
sexual orientation. The articles were published between the years 2006 (26.47%) and 
2007 (73.53%). There were eight dominant disciplines represented in the articles: 
philosophy (8.82%), education (5.88%), social work (5.88%), law/criminal justice 
(5.88%), psychiatry (11.76%), psychology (26.47%), sociology (5.88%), geography 
(8.82%), and other (17.65%). The theoretical kinds are not equally represented in the 
data
16
. The reason for this is that the social kinds thought community had more diversity 
in their approach and ways of defining sexual orientation than the natural kinds or the 
empty kinds thought communities. The social kinds thought community has the highest 
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representation of articles (52.94% or n=18), while the natural kinds and empty kinds 
thought communities are equally represented (23.53% or n=8/23.53% or n=8). The 
natural kinds thought community relies heavily on the scientific method, which made 
theoretical saturation occur quickly. Similarly, the empty kinds thought community relies 
on a lack of definitions and categorizations; making theoretical saturation occur more 
quickly.  The gender of the researchers in comparison to thought communities did not 
appear to be significant. A point of interest is that no exclusively female author presented 
research from a natural kinds’ standpoint.
17
 This may be a limitation of this research 
project. 
Constitutive and operational definitions are also analyzed for the purpose of 
identifying the theory of sexuality being presented in each type of definition. Tables 3 
and 4 depict the variations between the natural, social, and empty kinds’ classifications of 
sexual orientation between the two types of definitions. The natural kinds thought 
community has the largest variation of theories of sexual orientation between the two 
definitions. In the constitutive definitions, the natural kinds thought community primarily 
use a behavioral theory of sexual orientation (20.59%). In the operational definitions, 
they shift to a primarily self-identification theory of sexual orientation (17.65%). For the 
operational definition, the natural kinds thought community do not use a solely 
behavioralist definition. The social kinds thought community uses a variety of theories of 
sexual orientation in both types of definitions. The self-identification theory of sexual 
orientation is most consistently used in both definitions by the social kinds thought 
community: constitutive definition (26.47%) and operational definition (41.18%). The 
empty kinds thought community uses queer theory primarily in their constitutive 
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definition (20.59%). The empty kinds thought community relies more on “other” theories 
of sexuality (5.88%) and non-applicable (8.82%).
18
  
The content analysis of the focal groups chosen by the natural, social and empty 
kinds’ researchers revealed that in only one combination of focal groups was there an 
overlap between thought communities. The natural and social thought communities both 
used the focal group combination of bisexuals/gays/heterosexuals/lesbians. The natural 
kinds thought community used this combination once, whereas the social kinds thought 
community used this combination twice. The other focal groups or combination of focal 
groups were used solely by each particular thought community.
19
 
 
 
Grounded Theory Analysis 
 
 
 Principles for marking group membership, is the core variable that emerged 
during the axial coding stage of the data analysis. Corbin and Strauss identify the core 
variable as having “analytic power.” “What gives it that power is its ability to pull the 
other categories together to form an explanatory whole…and [it] should be able to 
account for considerable variation within categories” (146). Principles for marking group 
membership, is the core variable because it is interrelated to categories on two levels of 
analysis. The first level of analysis is the overarching theoretical account of what is 
happening on a macro-level regarding the various types of principles that mark group 
membership across all three thought communities. The second level of analysis takes into 
account the process occurring within each type of principle for marking group 
membership within each individual thought community. The macro-level analysis 
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focuses specifically on the three types of principles (natural/social/empty), strategies, and 
practices for creating, maintaining, and modifying group membership.
20
 The location of 
the micro-level of analysis takes place within the “strategy” section of the macro-level of 
analysis.    
 Table 1: Gender and Discipline  
 
Gender  Male  Female Both  Total  N 
Discipline 
Anthropology  2.94%  -----  -----  2.94%  1 
 
Behavioral   ------  2.94%  -----  2.94%  1 
 
Comparative  2.94%  ------  -----  2.94%  1  
 
Criminal Justice -----  ------  2.94%  2.94%  1  
 
Education  -----  2.94%  2.94%  5.88%  2 
 
Gender Develop -----  -----  2.94%  2.94%  1 
 
Geography  -----  8.82%  -----  8.82%  3 
 
History  2.94%  -----  -----  2.94%  1 
 
Law   -----  -----  2.94%  2.94%  1 
 
Nursing  2.94%  -----  -----  2.94%  1 
 
Philosophy  -----  5.88%  -----  5.88%  2 
 
Psychiatry  5.88%  -----  5.88%  11.76%            4  
 
Psychology  8.82%  5.88%  11.76% 26.47%            9 
 
Social Work  2.94%  2.94%  -----  5.88%  2 
 
Sociology  -----  -----  5.88%  5.88%  2 
 
Religious Studies -----  2.94%  -----  2.94%  1 
                  
Totals   29.40% 32.34% 35.28% 100.00% 34 
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Table 2: Kinds and Gender 
 
Kinds  NK  SK  EK  Total  N 
Gender  
 
Male  11.76% 8.82%  5.88%  26.46% 9 
 
Female -----  17.65% 14.71% 32.36% 11 
 
Both  11.76% 26.47% 2.94%  35.29% 12 
          __ 
Total  23.52% 52.93% 23.53% 100.00% 34 
 
 
 
Table 3: Kinds and Constitutive Definitions 
 
Kinds   NK  SK  EK  Total  N 
Constitutive 
Definition 
 
Behavioral 20.59% 8.82%  -----  29.41% 10 
 
Dispositional 2.94%  2.94%  -----  5.88%  2 
 
Self-ID -----  26.47% -----  26.47% 9 
 
Queer Theory -----  -----  20.59% 20.59% 7  
 
Self-ID/ -----  14.71% -----  14.71% 5 
Behavioral 
 
Self-ID/ -----  -----  2.94%  2.94%  1 
Queer Theory 
          ___ 
Totals  23.53% 52.94% 23.59% 100.00% 34 
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Table 4: Kinds and Operational Definitions 
 
Kinds   NK  SK  EK  Total  N 
Operational 
Definition 
 
Behavioral  -----  2.94%  -----  2.94%  1 
 
Dispositional  -----  -----  -----  -----  0 
 
Self-ID  17.65% 41.18% -----  58.83% 20 
 
Queer Theory  -----  -----  5.88%  5.88%  2 
 
Self-ID/  5.88%  -----  -----  5.88%  2 
Behavioral 
 
Self-ID/  -----  -----  2.94%  2.94%  1 
Queer Theory 
 
N/A   -----  8.82%  5.88%  14.70% 5 
 
Other   -----  -----  8.82%  8.82%  3 
           ___ 
Totals   23.53% 52.94% 23.52% 100.00% 34 
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Table 5: Kinds and Focal Groups 
 
Kinds   NK  SK  EK  Total  N___ 
Focal  
Groups  
 
Bisexual  -----  -----  -----  -----  0 
Male/Female 
 
Gay   -----  11.76%  -----  11.76%  4 
 
Heterosexual  -----  2.94%  -----  2.94%  1 
Male/Female 
 
Lesbian   -----  5.88%  -----  5.88%  2 
 
Queer   -----  -----  11.76%  11.76%  4 
 
B(M)G*
21
  -----  5.88%  -----  5.88%  2 
  
B(M)GH(M)*  2.94%  -----  -----  2.94%  1 
 
BGHL*  2.94%  5.88%  -----  8.82%  3 
  
BGHLQ*  -----  2.94%  -----  2.94%  1 
 
BGL*   -----  2.94%  -----  2.94%  1 
 
BGLQ*  -----  -----  5.88%  5.88%  2 
 
BH*   -----  2.94%  -----  2.94%  1 
 
GH(M)*  2.94%  -----  -----  2.94%  1 
 
GHL*   14.71%  -----  -----  14.71%  5 
 
GL*   -----  11.76%  -----  11.76%  4 
 
GQ*   -----  -----  2.94%  2.94%  1 
 
LQ*   -----  -----  2.94%  2.94%  1 
           ___ 
Totals   23.53%  52.92%  23.52%  100.00% 34 
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 B(M)G: Bisexual and Gay Males, B(M)GH(M): Bisexual, Gay, and Heterosexual Males. BGHL: 
Bisexuals, Gays, Heterosexuals, and Lesbians. BGHLQ: Bisexuals, Gays, Heterosexuals, Lesbians, Queers. 
BGL: Bisexuals, Gays and Lesbians. BGLQ: Bisexuals, Gays, Lesbians and Queers. BH: Bisexuals and 
Heterosexuals. GH(M): Gay and Heterosexual Males. GHL: Gays, Heterosexuals and Lesbians. GL: Gays 
and Lesbians. GQ: Gays and Queers. LQ: Lesbians and Queers. 
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Table 6: GTM Macro-Analysis 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
PRINCIPLES/ 
ASSUMPTIONS 
SOCIAL 
KINDS: 
Stable Social 
World, 
Temporally 
in Motion 
NATURAL 
KINDS: 
Laws of 
Nature, 
Stable World 
EMPTY 
KINDS: 
Resist 
Structures, 
No Objective 
World 
STRATEGY 
Focus on 
“Wanting” as 
the Core 
Variable. 
STRATEGY 
Focus on 
“Affirmation 
Process” as 
the Core 
Variable 
STRATEGY 
Focus on 
“Resistance: 
Creation” as 
the Core 
Variable 
PRACTICE 
Lump people 
based on high 
degrees of 
exclusivity, 
typicality, 
stability, and 
duration.  
PRACTICE 
Lump people 
based on social 
structure and 
process of 
identification. 
 
PRACTICE 
Lump people 
based on high 
degrees of 
inclusivity of 
resistance. 
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Principles for Marking Group Membership: Natural, Social and Empty 
 
 
 The principles or assumptions for marking group membership relate to the 
researchers’ perceptions or “mental lenses” through which they view the world. 
Zerubavel argues, “…there is always more than only one cognitive ‘standpoint’ from 
which something can be mentally approached. As a result, there is also more than just a 
single way in which it can be ‘correctly’ perceived” (30). The principles or assumptions 
of the researchers often contribute to how the researchers perceive and process 
information. Zerubavel explains that there are “schematic mental structures” in place 
before perception (24). These mental structures refer to the principles and assumptions of 
the researchers. The natural, social and empty kinds thought communities each hold a set 
of different principles/assumptions that influence thought processes for encountering new 
information.  
 
Natural Kinds Principles 
 
 
 The natural kinds’ researchers perceive sexual orientation from the standpoint that 
they are real empirical objects in the world that can be analyzed. The 
principles/assumptions regarding the nature of the physical world are the “cognitive 
mental schemas” that researchers in the natural kinds thought communities are using to 
create definitions for sexual orientation. The scientific method has its roots in Greek 
philosophy, which emphasizes the notion that “the world is fundamentally static and 
unchanging” (Richard Nisbett 2003: 10). The assumption that the world is stable allows 
researchers the structure to examine physical objects in the world. Although few natural 
kinds’ researchers believe that sexual orientation has an essence, they do believe that 
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sexual orientation has biological origins. Nisbett continues to explain, “The central, basic, 
sine qua non properties of an object constituted its ‘essence’ [origin], which was 
unchanging by definition, since if the essence of an object changed it was no longer the 
object but something else” (9). An indicator of these “cognitive tools” in the natural 
kinds’ principles/assumptions is the existence of origins in their work. Origins function as 
the “first cause” or “starting point” in the articles. The function of an origin in this 
research emphasizes the assumption within the natural kinds’ cognitive standpoint that 
there is a real, measurable, and largely stable nature for sexual orientations.  
Each of the natural kinds’ researchers indicated a potential origin for sexual 
orientation. During the micro-level analysis of the natural kinds’ standpoint, origins 
emerged as a theoretically saturated variable that included the concepts: marking a form 
as fundamental or essential, originating (in vivo code), inheriting, and marking 
predisposition. For example, one set of researchers explain that sexual orientation has a 
prenatal or biological origin. “Evidence that handedness is related to sexual orientation 
suggests a biological (e.g. prenatal) basis to sexual orientation, because handedness is a 
marker of early neurodevelopment” (Article 4: 141). This same set of researchers goes on 
to say, “This immune response may eventually affect later male pregnancies, causing an 
alteration in brain development (e.g. hypothalamus) that affects sexual orientation” (141).   
Another set of researchers echo these results, saying, “Recent data have further shown 
that biological brothers increase the odds of homosexuality in later-born males” (Article 
6: 1). Natural kinds’ researchers use origins, based on their principles/assumptions 
regarding the structure of the world, in order to create and maintain their definitions in 
research projects. The maintenance of natural kinds’ principles/assumptions for creating 
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definitions in research articles, results in strengthening/solidifying or reifying these 
definitions of sexual orientation.  
 
Social Kinds Principles 
 
 
 The principles/assumptions for marking group membership for sexual orientation 
in the social kinds thought community relate to their perception of reality or the world. 
The social kinds’ thought community perceives the world as being comprised of both 
ideas and objects. Ideas are perceived as entities existing only within particular social 
contexts or as being ontologically subjective. The idea of a person being marked for 
group membership is only possible within a social context. Sexual orientations are 
perceived, by the social kinds thought community, to be an idea construction because it 
relies on the intersection of social structures throughout temporal space for its social 
existence.  
 Berger and Luckman (1966) explain that through the process of objectivation 
human products “attain the character of objectivity.”  The process of object construction 
enables researchers in the social kinds’ thought community to empirically measure 
epistemologically objective entities without naturalizing them. Avoiding the reification of 
these human products is a principle concern for social kinds’ theorists and researchers. 
Berger and Luckman warn that once objectivation has occurred, reification is 
dangerously close. “In other words, despite the objectivity that marks the social world in 
human experience, it does not thereby acquire an ontological status apart from the human 
activity that produced it” (61). When social kinds’ theorists internalize or adopt the 
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objective properties and attributes of these objects/products, it is necessary that they do so 
with awareness that the objects are still, ultimately, a human product.  
 The main principle/assumption underlying the social kinds’ theoretical position is 
that social reality is relatively stable, yet in constant temporal motion. In other words, the 
social kinds thought community assumes that there are stable structures but through 
temporal motion there is not a “fixed” reality. Because, the social kinds’ researchers 
perceive the social world to be relatively stable, it enables them to analyze the social 
structures upholding these definitions. Social structures reinforce the stability of the 
social world, while also being constantly in motion.  
The influence that temporal movement has on social structures is a contextual 
variable that emerged in the social kinds’ research articles. The structure of “temporal 
movement” can be “carved” into discrete entities with various degrees of mental voids 
among them. Zerubavel explains (1991) “The meaning of social acts and situations is 
largely dependent on their temporal context…In other words, time seems to constitute 
one of the major parameters of the context on which the meaning of social acts and 
situations depend” (101). Two examples of temporal shifts are indicated in articles 9 and 
10. Article 9 indicates that “…people we now call ‘gays’ and ‘lesbians’ have been 
traveling to various places around the globe for hundreds of years” (49). Article 10 
echoes a similar temporal cognitive social structure. “Although the social construction of 
the homosexual-heterosexual binary is a fairly recent phenomenon, it is likely that men 
who would now define themselves as gay have fathered children since ancient times”  
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(367). The researchers in these articles are making discrete temporal distinctions between 
the past and present conceptions of sexual orientation. 
 During the micro-level grounded theory analysis, social contexts emerged as the 
structures or foundations from which the actual definitions or characteristics for group 
membership were formed. The emergence of social structures in the social kinds’ articles 
is an indicator of their idea that the world is both stable and temporally in motion. When 
social kinds’ theorists analyze the social world, they must capture a “still frame” of the 
social world in motion. Because marking group membership for sexual orientation is an 
idea construction, the social context surrounding possible characteristics are always 
changing. The variable, “social structure,” sets parameters around these social contexts 
within their respective times of occurrence in hopes of retaining the original meanings. 
The social kinds thought community use the variable “social structure” as a context from 
which to configure or define various aspects of group membership. Maintenance of these 
definitions is only possible within the same social parameters used to define them in the 
first place. The maintenance of group membership can occur only in the society from 
which it originated, the time period of origination, and under similar circumstances. 
Modifications of criteria for group membership can occur by changing the “social 
structure.”   
 
Empty Kinds Principles 
 
 
 The empty kinds thought community is characterized by their rejection of 
absolute truths or facts about the world. The principles/assumptions of the empty kinds 
thought community are that the world is not stable and that our classificatory schemes do 
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not discover real facts about the world. The empty kinds thought community rejects 
classificatory schemes based on their perception that there is no singular “general’ 
meaning” or “point of reference” for any type of classification. The empty kinds thought 
community rejects all types of classificatory structures including space and time. 
Shannon Winnubst (2006) argues, “Spatially, this setting of boundaries and limits around 
defined units of property introduces an order of finitude into what was understood to be 
an infinite, boundless abundance” (33). The spatiality is rejected because it “contains” 
people/objects into classes unnecessarily. Temporality also is perceived to be a structure 
that constricts people. “It carves power into our bodies and into the world, telling where 
we came from and where we are placed in this world and its social map of power” (152).  
The principles/assumptions of the empty kinds thought community is that categorization 
and demarcation, especially when applied to group membership is a misguided endeavor 
because there is no singular meaning that can be shared by any of its members. 
 The principles/assumptions of the empty kinds’ thought community that no two 
people can share the experience of a singular classification and that there are no 
“significant” or “real” characteristics for classifying people into group membership seem 
to be in conflict by the existence of their own shared thought “community.” There are 
theoretically saturated indicators that the empty kinds thought communities have similar 
assumptions about the nature of their group and criteria for inclusion into group 
membership. The variable criteria that emerged for group membership into the empty 
kinds thought community are: resistance of normative structures, resistance through 
creation, and possible types of creation. The covariances influencing these variables 
76  
include inclusivity, fluidity, ambiguity, and playfulness.
22
 The empty kinds thought 
community may perceive itself to be outside the realm of structure because their methods 
for acceptance into group membership is highly inclusive, fluid, ambiguous, and playful 
in regards to the possible ways of being and doing by their group members. While their 
criteria for inclusion may be “capturing” a multiplicity of subjective identities, their 
cognitive existence as a collective knowledge structure is firmly intact.  
Nippert-Eng’s (2005) concepts of “boundary play” and “boundary work” 
emphasize the empty kinds’ thought process for inclusion into group membership. 
“Boundary play’ is the visible, imaginative manipulation of shared cultural cognitive 
categories for the purpose of amusement” (302). Nippert-Eng argues that in order for 
“boundary play” to occur, players must share knowledge of normative structures. The 
first part of the thought process for the empty kinds’ thought community is based on the 
“resistance of social structures” variable, indicating that there is a shared knowledge of 
cognitive structures. The next point that Nippert-Eng argues must be in place is 
“categorical imagination” or having a flexible or fluid mental cognitive scheme. This 
cognitive mental scheme is a principle characteristic of the empty kinds’ thought 
community. The third characteristic of boundary play is the ability to “effectively 
translate cognitive flexibility” (305). This cognitive ability is captured in the data through 
the variable, “resistance through creation.”  
The empty kinds’ thought process found to be operating in the micro-level 
analysis is specified in article 34.  
The activity of queer is the “queering” of culture, ranging from 
…reinterpretation…to…deconstruction. As activity, we have seen the assertion of 
“queer” identity, notably held as lesbian, gay, transgender, bisexual, and 
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transsexual, as variants of human behavior that have rights on their own terms. As 
theory, queer’s derivation from postmodernism and poststructuralism leads to the 
rejection of all categorization as necessarily produced by dominant “regulatory 
regimes” (28). 
 
This passage further indicates that there is a reason for inconsistent tendency for some 
researchers to “lump” lesbian, gay, bisexual and transgender together under the umbrella 
term “queer.” The difference between actually queering something and the 
principles/assumptions of this thought communities are viewed inconsistently, which is 
what this passage seems to suggest.  
Article 34 is the only article that notes or marks empty kinds’ researchers using 
queer as an umbrella term for a variation of sexual identities. It may be an outlier in this 
particular research or may simply be a theoretically unsaturated variable due research 
restrictions. Sullivan (2003) notes that some queer theorists do place these types of 
identities under an umbrella term due to the lengthy amount of identities needing to be 
listed. Although this umbrella term does not deconstruct old categories, it is perceived to 
be needed to create “solidarity.” Sullivan argues, “In effect then, the term queer can at 
times be used in such a way as to imply the existence of some sort of queer 
solidarity…[but]…the use of queer as an umbrella term can…have the effect of 
(mis)representing us as one big happy (queer) family” (45). Although this variable was 
not theoretically saturated in this research project, past literature suggests that this is 
occurring in other research and theoretical projects.  
The empty kinds thought community’s principles/assumptions for “queer” group 
membership is based on their perception of instability and multiplicity within identity 
categories. Nippert-Eng’s “boundary play” model reflects the empty kinds’ cognitive 
thought process for marking “queer” group membership. The principles/assumptions of 
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this thought community create criteria for group membership by perceiving its possible 
members as being those who resist structures and resist through creation of new ways of 
being and doing. The principles/assumptions of the empty kinds thought community 
maintain classifications for group membership by remaining in opposition to social 
structure. These classifications are subject to becoming stable if they are continued to be 
maintained, which could lead to “queer” becoming a social kind.  
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Table 7: Empty Kinds GTM Analysis 
 
CAUSES      CORE VARIABLE                CONSEQUENCES 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Strategies for Marking Group Membership: Natural, Social, and Empty 
 
 
 Strategies for marking group membership involve mental focusing or separating 
the relevant from the irrelevant and framing. Zerubavel (1991) points out that the first 
process involved in focusing is separating the figures from the background (6). Certain 
characteristics of sexuality are considered relevant and irrelevant to each of the three 
RESISTANCE: 
CREATION 
 
 
QUEER 
THINGS 
Spaces, 
Sexuality, 
Identity, 
Queer-Being 
STRUCTURES 
Oppressive 
Social Structures 
Binary Structures 
Categories 
RESISTANCE: 
TEARING 
DOWN 
Denaturalize 
Destabilize 
Deconstruct 
 
DOING 
Experiencing 
Expressing 
Performing 
Thinking, 
Enacting, 
Organizing 
 
GROUP 
MEMBERSHIP: 
High: Fluidity, 
Ambiguity, 
Intersectionality, 
Playfulness, 
Inclusivity 
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theoretical standpoints. What is considered worth focusing on or ignoring is related to the 
principles or assumptions from which each researcher is operating. The act of framing 
refers to placing a “mental bracket” around characteristics considered relevant. In this 
project, the social and natural kinds’ theoretical standpoints use two different types of 
frames. Zerubavel (1991) defines a frame as being “…characterized not by its contents 
but rather by the distinctive way in which it transforms the content’s meaning” (11). The 
definitions for sexual orientation cognitively can be regarded as frames because the 
meaning of the content is changed depending upon what type of definition (constitutive 
or operational) is being used. 
The natural kinds, social kinds, and empty kinds all have a large frame. Only the 
natural and social kinds have a small frame. The large frame refers to the constitutive 
definitions they use in their research articles. “A constitutive definition defines a 
construct with other constructs. For instance, we can define ‘weight by saying that it is 
the ‘heaviness’ of objects. Or we can define ‘anxiety’ as ‘subjectified fear’ (Kerlinger and 
Lee 200: 28). The constitutive definition allows greater explanatory power on a 
theoretical level. The small frame refers to the operational definition. The operational 
definitions tend to be more basic than the constitutive definitions. “The operational 
definition assigns meaning to a construct or variable by specifying the activities or 
‘operations’ necessary to measure it. In short, it defines or gives meaning to a variable by 
spelling out what the investigator must do to measure it” (Kerlinger and Lee 28). The 
empty kinds do not have operational definitions because their principles and assumptions  
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regarding sexuality focus on the resistance of an empirical structure for measurement and 
organization.  
 
Natural Kinds Strategies 
 
 
 The strategies being used to create a definition for sexual orientation refer to 
specific styles of mental focusing by researchers operating from the natural kinds’ 
principles/assumptions. The close relationship between Greek philosophy and the 
scientific method combine to form the natural kinds’ principles/assumptions, resulting in 
a unique natural kinds’ style of mental focusing. Nisbett argues, “But still more basic to 
Greek philosophy is its background scheme, which regarded the object in isolation as the 
proper focus of attention and analysis” (10). The natural kinds’ researchers often isolate 
sexual orientation from surrounding (primarily social) contexts in order to examine its 
attributes or properties. The properties and attributes of sexual orientation for natural 
kinds are highly influenced by their guiding principles/assumptions or ways of perceiving 
information regarding sexuality.  
 The relevant properties and attributes that emerged in the micro-level of analysis 
for the natural kinds’ large frames or constitutive definitions involves one or more of the 
following criteria: claiming a particular identity, engaging in sexual acts with a person of 
a particular sex/gender, having sexual preferences, and/or sharing similar (sometimes 
sex-specific) origins.
23
 The process that emerged among these properties and attributes is 
largely a causal process. The focus of these researchers’ inclusion into group membership 
is the core variable: “wanting”. Wanting refers to marking sexual preference, interest, 
thoughts, feelings, attraction, and arousal. The “wanting” variable was not able to be 
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captured within the standard content analysis, but is significantly referenced as the core 
variable within the grounded theory analysis. The “wanting” variable in this research 
appears to be more influential than the “doing” variable, which is often not the case in 
past literature.  
The process begins with “origins” because they are the emergent causes that 
influence the conditional “doing” variable, and then ultimately influence the “wanting” 
variable. “Doing” refers to performing and engaging in sexual activities. The condition 
leading from the focal variable to the consequence variable is “identification;” this 
variable refers to self-identification or self-reporting of sexual identity by the research 
subjects. The consequence variable is “group membership” because it is the goal that the 
researchers are working towards defining. 
 “Origin” is the variable that gives this definition theoretical power. Without the 
inclusion of origins within the natural kinds’ constitutive definition, it would merely be 
an operational definition. The other variables can be measured empirically. For example, 
the “identification” variable was measured in all the natural kinds’ research articles by 
asking the subjects their sexual orientations. “The first item asked: What is your sexual 
orientation? Participants answered from a drop-down menu, the choice being 
Heterosexual (straight), homosexual (gay/lesbian), and bisexual” (Article 6: 3). Similar 
questions were asked regarding the variables “doing” and “wanting.” “We determined 
sexual orientation by using two questions: one concerning the participant’s sexual 
attraction toward men and women (i.e. sexual thoughts and feelings)…and the other 
concerning his sexual behaviors (i.e. actual experiences) (Article 4: 142). The operational 
definition is more heavily focused on by the natural kinds’ perspective because it is used 
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to measure the variables’ properties for inclusion into the “group membership” variable 
often for the purpose of uncovering some natural or biological basis or origin for sexual 
orientation.  
 The strategy that the natural kinds’ thought community is using to maintain its 
definitions for group membership is by continuing to perceive and promote the 
perception that homosexuals and heterosexuals are two virtually discrete entities. 
Zerubavel (1991) argues,  
In order to maintain our experience of the world as made up of discrete 
islands of meaning, we must perceive the insular character of mental 
entities—that is, carefully insulate them from one another. The stretches of 
void we visualize among them clearly enhance our perception of their 
separateness. The existence of such gaps must therefore be constantly 
reaffirmed (33). 
 
The mental space perceived by natural kinds in regards to homosexuals and heterosexuals 
is vast because the natural kinds’ assume that these two entities have different origins. 
The maintenance of these ways of perceiving sexual orientation also results in a reified 
modification of the natural kinds’ definitions.  
 
Social Kinds Strategies 
 
 
 The strategies being used to create definitions for sexual orientation in the social 
kinds’ thought community is by sharing a similar “optical socialization” or mental focus. 
Social kinds’ researchers share similar ways of focusing on the existence of social 
structures, yet they attend to different types of social structures. Zerubavel (1997) 
explains, “Such ‘optical’ socialization takes place at the level of entire professions as well 
as particular ‘schools’ or ‘paradigms’ within professions…As a result, one finds 
considerable differences in mental focusing (49). A wide range of disciplines emerged in 
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the social kinds’ research articles, yielding different social contexts for “mental focus.” 
The various disciplines representing the social kinds’ thought community include: 
women studies, social work, criminal justice, sociology, psychology, philosophy, 
anthropology, nursing, law, psychiatry and education.  
Four contexts for social structure emerged during the grounded theory micro-level 
analysis of the social kinds’ articles: structure of physical health, institutional structure, 
structure of discrimination and cultural structure. The structure of physical health is the 
context from which the social kinds’ researchers evaluate relevant characteristics for 
group membership. The “structure of physical health” context indicates an emphasis on 
sexual behavior (doing) and identity (identification) within the gay male ‘community.’ In 
these articles, the operational definition for inclusion into group membership reflects this 
context of physical health. Article 15 defines group membership for gay men as follows:  
Men aged 18 and older who reported sex of any kind with a man since age 
14 or who self-identified as gay or bisexual were considered eligible to 
participate…A broad definition of gay and other MSM helped ensure 
enrollment of men who might not otherwise be included on the basis of 
self-labels for sexual orientation or infrequent same gender sexual activity 
(272). 
 
This definition focuses on the conditional variable “age” to be important under the 
context of sexual health. Possibilities for restricting the age of past experience may be 
because the researcher does not considers sexual identification to occur by this age or the 
researcher does not think fourteen year olds are old enough to be engaging in particular 
sexual health situations. The variable “doing” is the ultimate focus in this article because 
the “identification” variable is negated by the inclusion of people who do not have to  
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identify. The “identification” variable is simply used to track instances of “doing.” Due to 
the sexual health context of this article, behavior is the primary focus for the definition.  
 Another indicator of focus for the social kinds’ thought community on the 
behavioral or “doing” variable occurs in article 17. “All men were asked to indicate their 
relationship status and also provide behavioral information about any sexual partners (i.e. 
number of partners, type of sexual behaviors)” (1). The purpose of creating a group 
membership in this physical health context is to track people in ‘communities’ that may 
be having a shared experience of something potentially harmful to this social groups’ 
health. The purpose for article 17 was to track gay men on the basis of AIDS prevention 
due to ‘condom fatigue’ in order to learn more about this phenomenon.  
Article 19 also tracks men for the purpose of learning more about a phenomenon: 
the combination of drug and sexual identity. The primary focus in this article is the 
variable “identification.” In this article, the constitutive definition emphasizes a focus on 
the combination of two separately perceived identities merging into a single inseparable 
entity. “Stimulant drugs, such as methamphetamine, are appealing to gay men because 
the drug counteracts pre-existing anxieties about sex. For some gay men and bisexual 
men, methamphetamine becomes part of their sexual identity” (76). The operative 
definition simply specifies that one must self-identify as gay or bisexual and report more 
that six instances of ‘club drug’ use within the timeframe of a year. The physical health 
structures in these articles represent the purpose or causes for needing a group  
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membership and also influence how researchers think about what should be included for 
group membership to be relevant within this context.  
The institutional structure refers to the researchers’ focus on organizations that are 
perceived to influence members of a community. The specific institutional structure is 
high school and college environments. The constitutive definition in article 29 
emphasizes the relationship between context and possible empirical or operational 
definitive characteristics. “The importance of connecting the environment to identity is 
particularly relevant with the LGB student population, given that the college environment 
is often the context for the coming out process” (216). The operational definition tracks 
group membership through the variable “identification,” requiring the participants to self-
identify their sexual identity. This article also indicates the reflexivity of the classification 
processes by arguing that these LGB identities reflect back upon the social context, 
thereby changing the context in various positive or negative ways. This article, as well as 
others based on “institutional structure” indicated that the amount of people who self-
identified in a particular environment resulted in a change in the environment, ultimately 
affecting the amount of people who self-identified in the future. Haslanger identifies this 
type of construction as a discursive construction. 
“Structures of discrimination” influence the social kinds’ definitions for group 
membership because the researcher must specify the type of group. For example, 
homosexuals are considered ‘sexual minorities,’ thus making their social position in 
society different than heterosexuals. Heterosexism and homophobia are “structures of 
discrimination” that influence the inclusion of criteria for group membership in an 
‘oppressed’ group versus the inclusion of criteria for group membership in a ‘dominant’ 
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group.  Strategies the social kinds’ thought community use to achieve equality or to 
dismantle the “structure of discrimination” is to focus on the similarities and needs for 
similarity between the dominant and marginal group.  
Social kinds’ researchers often use the strategy of focusing on the similarities of 
characteristics between marginal and dominant group membership in order to change/end 
the context or “structure of discrimination.” For example, article 16 focuses on the 
similarity between two different groups by using a concept of shared “personhood.” “If it 
is accepted that persons regard their sexual attraction to persons of the same sex as 
integral to their personality, it would follow that an encroachment of that aspect of their 
person would constitute a violation of their integrity as a person and to their inherent 
human dignity” (90). This researcher is focusing on the concept of a shared humanity. 
Martha Nussbaum (1995) argues, that this theoretical position “…instructs us to focus on 
what all human beings share, rather than on the privileges and achievements of a 
dominant group, and on needs and basic functions, rather than power or status” (124). 
Nussbaum suggests that this approach is the best “starting point” for “reflection” and 
“claims for justice” (125). 
Article 18 provides an example of how social kinds’ researchers are emphasizing 
the differences in the form of domination/subordination between heterosexuals and 
homosexuals in order to obtain equality or sameness. In this social context, the definition 
of sexual orientation is based on the combination of sexual identification and 
identification as a victim of intimate violence. “Existing biases against gay and lesbian 
lifestyles and the dominance of heterosexual attitudes within the police department and 
the courtroom have not created the same atmosphere of legal support and resolution that 
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is offered to heterosexual victims of violence” (381). The focus in this definition is the 
need for similar treatment.  
“Cultural structures” are the final set of social structures that influences 
definitions for sexual orientations. “Cultural structures” refer to the ways in which 
different societies produce distinct ways of perceiving and focusing information within 
the context of a particular culture/society.  Zerubavel (1997) argues, “Society, in short, 
plays a major role in organizing our ‘optical’ predisposition…many of the mental lenses 
through which we come to ‘see’ the world are actually sociomental lenses grounded in 
particular social environments” (31). The principle/assumption that criteria for group 
membership are social products is focused on by social kinds’ attention to cultural 
differences.   
Article 13 indicates, “If a masculine Latino male engages in homosexual 
behavior, his masculinity will not be called into question as long as he remains the 
dominant partner. Many Latino men who have sex with men will label themselves 
heterosexual and, in many instances, marry and raise a family” (13). The criterion for 
“heterosexual” identification in this culture is not based on exclusive same-sex behavior. 
This cultural context also places a focus on the dominant partner in male same-sex 
behavior as criterion for a particular sexual identification. Article 9 also indicates the 
culturally bounded nature of group membership. The researcher notes that a Barbadian 
male interviewee “revealed how homosexuality was not uniformly organized around the 
world and that one should not expect to find a scene in Barbados that duplicated London, 
Toronto, or Amsterdam” (58). “Cultural structure” is a social context that focuses on the 
‘mental fences’ between societies. Characteristics for group membership cannot be 
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generalized to all societies because “cultural structures” for organizing information are 
not always similar. In other words, societies do not perceive individuals to be organized 
into sexual based categories in the same ways or some times not at all; making a 
generalized group membership impossible or an irrelevant endeavor.   
The social kinds thought community is using mental focusing strategies based on 
principles/assumptions that reflect their social world view for creating definitions within 
various social contexts. These types of definitions are maintained by continued focus on 
the world as a social product. The focal criteria for group membership need to be focused 
on as social products that occur within particular contexts. Focal criteria for group 
membership are modified only when there are shifts in the social contexts from which 
they are derived.   
 
Empty Kinds Strategies 
 
 
 The empty kinds thought community strategically focuses on the resistance of 
social structures and the creation of new possibilities for being and doing as ways of 
resisting structure. Empty kinds’ researchers focus on social structures they perceive to 
be sites for resistance or dismantling. Nippert-Eng suggests that this is the first criteria for 
“boundary play.” “Boundary play centers on the classificatory boundary between two 
related, cultural-cognitive categories” (304). In article 11, the empty kinds theorist is 
focusing on “…heterosexuality’s normative status and attempts to denaturalize and 
destabilize existing categories of sexual orientation and of gender…and opposes the use 
of labels to describe sex, gender, and desire” (22). Article 30 echoes these results by 
suggesting that sexual categories should be suspended. Article 31 suggests that the empty 
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kinds’ perspective is to resist or deconstruct “authoritative knowledge.” The empty kinds’ 
theorist in article 32 points out that some structures being deconstructed that are not 
popularly discussed are: ethics, methodology and disciple. Article 34 indicates that 
definitions are also elements needing to be deconstructed, which is why empty kinds’ 
theorists attempt to not define characteristics for group membership. Article 12 indicates 
that “an understanding of identity as being linguistically and ontologically incapable of 
expressing complex human behaviors” is the focus of resistance underlying the need to 
create new possibilities. The empty kinds’ theorists are focusing on these sites of 
resistance for the purpose of creating new ways of resisting.  
 The core variable, “resisting through creation” is the most important method of 
resistance and the main criteria for “queer” group membership by the empty kinds 
thought community. There are three theoretically saturated types of creative resistance 
that emerged in the data: space, doing, and being. Nippert-Eng’s model of “boundary 
play” reveals how resistance of normative structures or boundaries and the creation of 
new boundaries relate in process. Nippert-Eng suggests that “players” need to share a 
normative understanding of how two or more categorical “boundaries” are related and 
then whether or not they wish to use this as a focal point for “playing.” Nipper-Eng 
explains, “A boundary player’s skill includes the ability to sustain play by cleverly 
inferring or referencing the ‘normal’ ways in which one draws the categorical line while 
proposing and helping oneself and others to consider the world implied by the alternate 
cognitive configurations” (305). Article 11 indicates that a popular focus for queer 
members is gender and sexuality. “To be queer, is ‘to be as visible as possible’ and ‘to 
reveal the twists of gender and sexuality (of whatever sexual orientation)” (23). The 
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empty kinds members “play” with the boundaries between gender and sexuality, while 
the ‘normal’ is being referenced by those who are upholding traditional structures and not 
engaging in their “boundary play.”     
 Space is a “resistance through creation” because it has been designed as a place of 
“boundary play.” Nippert-Eng argues, “Space is experienced, not merely imagined. It is 
especially good at letting us understand, viscerally, the results of our more heady play, 
fusing mind-body distinctions into forceful, all-encompassing engagements. Here, then, 
in the realm of the spatial, we find the perfect place for a play date…” (319). Spatial 
entities the data focused specifically on are bathhouses and clubs. Article 31 indicates, 
“The central objective…is the ‘queering’ of identities through the creation of a space 
where alternative cultural practices could be performed, denaturalizing and confounding 
normalized ways of doing and being” (105). The researchers in this empty kinds’ article 
continue to emphasize that these ‘queered’ spaces are sites for challenging their own 
singular lesbian identities. The particular spaces being created in some of these articles 
are “bathhouses.” Bathhouses are considered creations that support “casual, kinky, and 
public sex” (100). These types of spaces ultimately provide an environment for playing 
with the typical norms surrounding gender and sexuality.  
 The “doing” and “being” variables being created through resistance are also 
focused on by the empty kinds’ thought community. They also represent “boundary play” 
because the participants are actively redrawing boundary lines to engage in their play. 
Article 11 indicates some new ways of “doing” that are created through resistance. These 
new ‘queer’ ways of doing are: engaging in gender play, sling rooms, cross dressing, and 
“guiltless friendly sex” (27). Article 31 indicates sexual activity or “doing” that occurred 
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at a bathhouse event. “Several informants asked us directly whether we had participated 
in any of the sexual activities that had been planned by the organizers of the event (e.g. 
erotic massage, g-spot discovery, sexual counseling, lap dances)” (104). The idea of 
“being” queer is represented in the articles as a way of being resistant to structural forces. 
Article 11 indicates that “being” a queer subject is remaining in a state of resistance. “We 
maintained that the state renders invisible any attempt by the TWBC to open up a space 
for queer subjects to flourish” (19). Empty kinds’ primary focus is on resistance through 
both deconstructionist projects and the creation of new possibilities for “space,” “doing” 
and “being.” 
The strategies for the empty kinds thought community is their focus on both the 
ways of resistance and the products of resistance. The primary focus is on the thought 
process for “creating through resistance” because this is the underlying story regarding 
their principles and methods for inclusion into group membership. These focusing 
strategies are being maintained by their thought community through their exposure in 
journals and books. These strategies of mental focusing are modified either by the 
thought community shifting the mental focus in an act of resistance or by strengthening 
their strategy of mental focusing; making it more concrete and less abstract. 
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Table 8: Natural Kinds GTM Analysis 
 
 
Causes: Origins  Core Variable: Wanting              Consequences: Group Membership 
 
 
Practices for Marking Group Membership: Natural, Social, and Empty 
 
 
 The practices for marking group membership are how the natural, social and 
empty kinds’ thought communities are classifying or drawing boundaries around what is 
included their definitions. The process of classifying is related to what each thought 
WANTING 
Sexual: Interest, 
Preference, 
Feelings, 
Attraction, 
Thoughts, 
Arousal 
 
IDENTIFICATION 
Self-Report 
Self-Identification 
ORIGINS 
Inheriting 
Predisposing 
Originating 
Forming 
 
DOING 
Sexual: Act,  
Performance, 
Behavior 
GROUP 
MEMBERSHIP 
High Degrees of  
Duration, 
Exclusivity 
Stability 
Typicality 
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community perceives as relevant or irrelevant. The thought communities’ lump together 
characteristics they perceive to be similar and split characteristics perceived to be 
different. Each of the thought communities has different ways for lumping and splitting 
criteria for group membership. While some thought communities perceive large mental 
voids between two entities, others view these differences as minor and not worth 
mentioning. Zerubavel (1991) explains, “Classifying presupposes an ability to ignore 
‘trivial’ differences among variants of the same mental entity, and what often looks like 
an inability to differentiate may very well be a deliberate disregard for negligible 
differences that ‘make no difference” (63). Classification relies on the thought 
communities’ principles/perceptions and strategies/focusing in order to separate or 
combine variables for group membership, therefore; each group draws the lines of 
classification differently.  
 
Natural Kinds Practices  
 
 
 The thought processes for categorizing people into group membership are based 
on the principles/assumptions of the natural kinds thought community (i.e. the scientific 
method). Nisbett explains, “Once the object is taken as the starting point, then many 
things follow automatically: The attributes of the object are salient; the attributes become 
the basis of categorization of the object; the categories become the basis of rule 
construction; and events are then understood as the result of objects behaving in 
accordance with rules” (10). The strategy of focusing, for the natural kinds thought 
community, results in the following variable attributes being discovered: “origins,” 
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“doing,” “wanting,” “identification” and “group membership.” The practice stage of the 
natural kinds’ thought process of classification involves rule construction.  
The natural kinds’ practices for classifying people into groups are based on a 
strict matter of degree for the covariances: exclusivity, typicality, duration and stability. 
These covariances indicate that the natural kinds’ style of classification is rigid; defined 
by sharp demarcations among islands of meanings. Zerubavel (1997) describes a rigid-
minded thought community as having,  
…an inflexible mind-set distinctively characterized by strict adherence to 
a purist, “either/or” logic. [And]…typically cherish razor sharp, clear-cut 
distinctions and are generally averse to ambiguous hybrids and in-
betweens that might challenge the perceived mutual exclusivity of their 
categories…[T]hey are highly preoccupied with boundaries and extremely 
obsessed with preserving mental purity and avoiding mental 
contamination (56). 
 
The natural kinds’ categorization of people into group membership is precise, containing 
only limited degrees of variation. 
The characteristic of rigid classifications for natural kinds’ researchers emerged 
during the micro-analysis of their definitions. The “identification” variable in some 
articles was a rigid distinction between one discrete group and another discrete group. For 
example, “Participants’ partners were divided into four groups based on sex and whether 
the relationship context was homosexual or heterosexual” (3). The classifications for 
inclusion into the category homosexual or heterosexual in many of these research articles 
involves the degree to which the subjects fit their prototypical expectations. An example 
of this emphasis on clear rigid definitions is article 3. “Bisexual participants were 
removed because the major aim of the experiments was to predict heterosexual versus 
homosexual orientation and those without a clear category could not be used…” (3). 
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Article 3 also indicates that an emphasis on the degree of exclusivity is a common 
practice for researchers in the natural kinds thought community. “For the sake of 
simplicity in this study, only participants who described themselves as mainly 
heterosexual or homosexual on this measure were included in the data analysis” (4). 
Article 1 also indicates the exclusive nature of covariance on the “identification” 
variable. “Only participants reporting as ‘exclusively heterosexual’ or ‘exclusively 
homosexual’ took part” (3). Article 2 described a need to examine self-identified 
homosexuals for the reason that it “should provide dramatic insight into male sexuality 
and female sexuality in their undiluted states” (2). These articles focus on a need for high 
degrees of exclusivity to be reported by their subjects in order to fit their classifications 
for group membership. 
Degrees of exclusivity also seem to influence other variables besides 
“identification.” Article 4 indicates that the “wanting” and “doing” variables are also 
categorized by the natural kinds researchers based on degree of exclusivity, although not 
nearly as rigidly as the “identification” variable. They determined sexual orientation 
based on the degrees of attraction toward men and women “ranging from 1 (exclusively 
homosexual/gay) to 7 (exclusively heterosexual/straight).” They also determined sexual 
orientation based on the degrees of sexual behaviors “ranging from 1 (exclusively 
homosexual/gay) to 4 (equally heterosexual/homosexual) formed the gay and bisexual 
group, whereas those averaging greater than 4 up to 7 (exclusively heterosexual) formed  
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the heterosexual group” (142). The variables “wanting” and “doing” have more allowable 
variance than the “identification” variable.  
Zerubavel (1991) argues, “Human behavior can vary over an enormous range, but 
each community draws a symbolic set of parentheses around a certain segment of that 
range and limits its own activities within that narrower zone” (16). In regards to the 
“wanting” and “doing” variables, the natural kinds thought community is generally 
looking for the clear prototypical cases, but do allow for cases with some degrees of 
variance. Article 6 is and indicator of this tendency to allow variance based on the 
“wanting” variable. “The second and third items asked: How sexually attracted are you to 
men, and How sexually attracted are you to women. The response options for each item 
represented seven degrees of preference with the end-points labeled ‘not at all’ and 
‘very” (3). Although this particular case does allow for variance, the natural kinds 
thought community only allows for a small range of variance for the “wanting” and 
“doing” variables.  
The narrow parameters for identification and slightly less narrow parameters for 
“wanting” and “doing” indicate that these researchers are looking for typicality as a 
characteristic of group membership. The focus that the natural kinds thought community 
places on the “clear cases” or “undiluted cases” indicates the importance of typicality for 
their definitions. The principles/assumptions of the natural thoughts community guide 
this type of focus because they believe that sexual orientation has a biological origin. In 
order for natural kinds’ researchers to discover or provide convincing evidence for a 
particular origin, they must have clear or unquestionable cases for group membership 
inclusion.  The small frame or operational definition is needed to be more specific than 
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the large frame or constitutive definition in order to capture ‘mostly discrete’ instances of 
group membership. The subjects marked for inclusion into group membership in the 
small frame are then able to produce various results regarding origins in the large frame. 
Typicality or consistency in the “wanting,” “doing” and “identification” variables 
is important for natural kinds thought communities. Article 6 is an example of the 
importance of typicality or consistency for group membership inclusion.  
Participants were screened according to the consistency of their responses 
to the three sexual orientation items. Consistency was determined as 
follows: If a male participant described himself as “Heterosexual 
(straight)” on the first item, then he had to report more attraction to 
women than to men on the other items. Conversely, if a male described 
himself as “Homosexual (gay)” on the first item, then he had to report 
more attraction to men than to women on the other items. If a male 
participant described himself as “Bisexual” on the first item, then he had 
to report at least some attraction (i.e. more than “Not at all”) both to men 
and to women. The same rules were applied, mutatis mutandis, to the 
female participants (164). 
 
The ideal case for natural kinds researchers are high degrees of typicality among these 
three variables. For example, an ideal case for this thought community would be high in 
exclusivity for the “identification” variable, high in frequency for the “doing” variable, 
and high in exclusivity of attraction/preference/interest toward a particular sex/gender in 
the “wanting” variable. Although membership does allow for slightly more variance, this 
represents the natural kinds’ ideal member. Variance is tolerated for the natural kinds 
thought community in the “wanting” and “doing” variables, but not the “identification” 
variable. The variance for “wanting” and “doing” is only a short “mental distance” from 
their “core essence” (Zerubavel 1991: 74).  
 Stability and duration are also covariances that influence group membership for 
natural kinds’ researchers. Stability and duration refer to the degrees in which a variable 
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remains the same for a certain duration or length of time. Article 3 is an example of how 
these two covariances are interrelated in regards to the “wanting” variable. “Sexual 
orientation is a multi-faceted construct and can vary over time and circumstances. 
However, most individuals possess a relatively stable tendency to seek sexual partners of 
the same gender, other gender, or both genders. This tendency is what we define as 
sexual orientation” (4). In this example, the researchers emphasize a “relatively” stable 
tendency for inclusion. This means that the researchers are lumping those who express 
more stability into a group and splitting those who express little stability on the 
“wanting” variable. The duration refers to the length of stability. If a subject expresses a 
stable tendency to be attracted to a particular sex/gender, then the duration can be 
inferred to be acceptable for inclusion.  This is because stability requires an X amount of 
time to become meaningful. If the researchers are satisfied by the degree of stability, it 
follows that they must also be satisfied by the length of duration.  
In many cases, high degrees of stability and duration are assumed in the variables. 
The principles/assumptions of the natural kinds’ thought community indicate that they 
believe the world is structured and that certain phenomenon operates under the laws of 
nature. This ‘fixed’ or ‘unchanging’ principle/assumption carries over into the assumed 
high levels of the “stability” and “duration” covariances.  The “identification” variable, 
for example, is often assumed to be “stable” vs. “unstable” and to exist in the individual 
“over a somewhat substantial length of time” vs. “a short unsubstantial length of time.” 
The “identification” variable is assumed by this thought community to remain largely 
stable over time. High degrees of “stability” and “duration” provide structure for this 
variable, as well as other variables. The assumption that these variables are highly 
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“stable” and exist over a substantial length of time is imbedded in their assumptions 
about the world being a “stable” place.  
  The natural kinds thought community is creating a definition for sexual 
orientation by classifying sexual orientation according to variables perceived as relevant 
and indicating that within these variables only moderately high to high degrees of 
variance are acceptable. The practice of classifying to create a definition of sexual 
orientation is maintained by its continued use as both a reliable and valid tool for 
measurement and theory. The wide use of a definition has a tendency to become modified 
as ‘naturalized’ or ‘reified’ over time; making the definition more concrete or ‘common 
sense’ among researchers and also the general population.  
 
Social Kinds Practices 
 
 
 The social kinds thought communities’ process for classifying people into sexual 
orientations reflects their perceptions of the social world as being relatively stable and in 
temporal motion. The micro-level of analysis of the social kinds’ articles suggests that 
“social structures” combined with “temporal structures” create the context for 
classifications of group membership. The “social structures” that emerged in the data 
analysis are: structures of physical health, institutional structures, structures for 
discrimination, and cultural structures. Classifications for sexual orientation must occur 
within these social structures. The combination of social structures produces a large 
mental field. Each social structure and combination of social structure presents a myriad 
of possibilities for classification. The social kinds’ researcher must first extract a “still 
frame” from the within the mental field in order for classification to occur. Although 
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there are many different possibilities for classification, one classificatory model emerged 
as the most theoretically saturated.  
 The “still frame” with the most theoretical saturation occurs within a combination 
of social structures, but places an emphasis on the “structure of discrimination.” The 
focusing strategies used by social kinds’ researchers involve the separation of the relevant 
from the irrelevant and “marked” from the “unmarked”. The “marked” group within this 
still frame is homosexuals. The discriminatory social structures 
(heterosexism/homophobia) mark homosexuals as being sexual minorities in a largely 
heterosexual world. Heterosexuals are regarded as being the sexual norm or standard. 
Heterosexual identification is often assumed and when revealed is largely regarded as 
insignificant. The “structures of discrimination” mark homosexual identity as unnatural 
and at odds with the heterosexual world. Identifying as a homosexual has real 
consequences within this social structure.  
 The social kinds thought community uses the following variables in their 
classification of homosexual group membership: wanting, doing, coming out, 
homosexual identity, affirmation, yes-saying and lifestyle. The “wanting” variable 
indicates attraction. “Doing” indicates performing sexual acts, doing sexual acts, having 
sexual experiences, marking sexual practices and marking sexual expression. “Coming 
out” refers to the social process of making an identity visible to others. “Homosexual 
identity” refers to a sex-based social identity that has been granted “affirmation” within a 
social process. The core variable is “affirmation” and it refers to the social process of 
“yes-saying” or self-identifying as a particular sexual orientation. The consequence of the 
affirmation process is represented by the variable, “lifestyle.” This variable represents the 
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end result of the actions/interactions among the other variables within a social structural 
context
24
.  
 The social structures underlying the classification of homosexual identity require 
that the initial identity or starting point be heterosexual. This is because heterosexuality is 
assumed to be the normative or presumed sexual identity of individuals in our society. 
Article 21 indicates, “In the majority of high schools in the United States, the prevailing 
norm regarding sexuality is heterosexuality and adolescents are socialized, both 
informally and formally toward heterosexual behaviors and relationships” (364). From 
the heterosexual standpoint, the variables “wanting” and “doing” interact with the initial 
heterosexual identity. If the initial identity interacts in a positive or “yes-saying” fashion, 
then the individual acknowledges an attraction towards the same-sex and/or an 
engagement in a sexual act with someone of the same-sex.  
The second stage of this process involves making the “wanting” and/or “doing” 
variable/s known. The social structural contexts of time, age, and location may influence 
the “coming out” variable in a positive or negative way. If it is negatively influenced, the 
person may conceal their identity or “pass” as a heterosexual. Article 26 indicates, 
“Because sexual orientation is not necessarily publicly identifiable some lesbians may 
choose to hide their sexual orientation in order to pass as heterosexual. The choice to pass 
as heterosexual maintains nondisclosure of sexual orientation under the guise of 
heterosexuality” (166). If it is positively influenced, then the “coming out” process will 
occur until the individual reaches the point of “affirmation” or the acceptance of this new 
homosexual identity. Article 27 indicates, “The act of accepting one’s own queerness—
saying yes to it somewhere in one’s experience or consciousness—is quite necessary for 
                                                 
24
 See Table 9. 
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‘being’ gay or lesbian” (83). The final stage or site of “affirmation” for a new identity is 
also where the set variables continue to reflect back and forth upon each other 
emphasizing the dialectical process of social construction. This dialectical process is 
marked by the “lifestyle” variable. 
The “coming out” process is focused upon as being relevant because the 
individuals involved in the process are perceived to be crossing a vast mental void from a 
presumed heterosexual identity to a homosexual identity. Zerubavel (1991) calls the 
perceived mental separation between heterosexual and homosexual identities, the” rites 
of separation.” Zerubavel argues, “Rites of separation are often designed to dramatize the 
mental gap between the old and new selves of people whose social identity is radically 
transformed as a result of crossing some critical mental partition” (23). Zerubavel argues 
that the process of crossing this culturally perceived mental gap requires “mental effort” 
and “giant mental leaps” (24). Becoming a homosexual appears to be less about checking 
off culturally relevant criteria and more about how these criteria operate within existing 
social structures producing a homosexual identity. For the social kinds thought 
community, attention to the social process of becoming or being a homosexual is more of 
a focal emphasis for classification than any combination of its static variables.  
The social kinds’ thought community uses the process of lumping and splitting to 
divide the world based on their perceptions of it. These divisions are maintained through 
their inclusion in the “social construction” process. As long as social structures remain 
relatively stable, classifications for group membership will also remain relatively stable.  
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Modifications in the classifications for group membership can be made by focusing on 
particular social structures and also through changes within the social structures.  
 
Empty Kinds Practices 
 
 
 The empty kinds’ thought community uses the practice of “lumping” or including 
a multiplicity of resistant identities together, while “splitting” or excluding those 
identities that are non-resistant. Inclusivity is a focal characteristic for the empty kinds 
thought community because it indicates their fundamental principle, which is to resist the 
exclusivity of binary structures. Inclusivity is a covariance for the variables “doing” and 
“being.” High degrees of inclusivity ultimately indicate that all types of resistant “doing” 
and ways of “being” are eligible for inclusion as a member. Members of the empty kinds 
thought communities are included on the basis of their mental levels of flexibility or 
fluidity. Having mental flexibility refers to being able to cognitively imagine ways of 
“being” or “doing/playing” outside the realm of structure. The high levels of ambiguity 
also characterize members of the empty kinds thought community because ambiguity 
resists structural elements through its characteristic of being neither one thing nor 
another. Playfulness is a characteristic of group membership because it emphasizes a high 
degree of cognitive imagination for ways of “being,” “doing” and “occupying space.” 
Inclusivity, flexibility, ambiguity, and playfulness are covariances that influence the 
variables “doing” and “being,” as well as “spaces” or sites of resistance.  
 These covariances also reflect Nippert-Eng’s model of “boundary play” and 
“boundary work” because their criteria for play are rearranging structural lines that make 
up dichotomies. Nippert-Eng argues,  
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…dichotomous categories, such as real-pretend, are equally good 
opportunities for both boundary play and boundary work. There is 
something about an either-or occasion that provides a great opportunity for 
those who have a vested interest in maintaining the dichotomy as a 
staunch reality (rather than a tool for interpreting and manipulating reality) 
as well as for those who like to use the occasion to have a little fun. 
 
The empty kinds’ thought community has a fuzzy or flexible world view that encourages 
“play” within dichotomous boundaries. A focus on inclusiveness, fluidity, ambiguity, and 
playfulness indicate this type of “boundary play.” Nippert-Eng argues that this type of 
boundary play can become boundary work if it is challenged or attempted to be 
maintained. It becomes “boundary work” when the empty kinds theorists use this as a 
political platform or an organized group.  
 The practices that the empty kinds thought community uses to classify group 
membership is by being highly inclusive in regards to the members ways of “doing” and 
“being.” In order to be inclusive, the research reveals that the empty kinds thought 
community relies on fluid, ambiguous, and playful ways of “doing” and “being” to resist 
normative structures. These classifications are being maintained through “boundary play” 
and “boundary work.” “Boundary play” is the reason for inclusion, whereas “boundary 
work” is the result of maintaining “boundary play.” This modifies the classification for 
group inclusion by making it appear to be a structure in and of itself, which is an 
unwanted consequence of the empty kinds’ theorists because they want their focus to 
remain on “boundary play.” 
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Table 9: Social Kinds GTM Analysis 
 
Causes: Social Structures  Core Variable: Process of ID  Consequence: Group Membership  
 
Social Structures (Structure of Discrimination) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Conclusion 
 
 
 Studying journal articles provides a way of viewing how different theoretical 
positions organize the world. LaRossa (1995) argues, “Lest researchers think that they are 
excluded from the cognitive processes…there is the important question of how the stories 
scholars tell in their books and articles are related to their efforts to lump and split the 
SAME-SEX 
WANTING 
Attraction 
CLOSET 
Concealment 
Passing 
HETEROSEXUAL 
IDENTITY 
 
SAME-SEX 
DOING 
Sexual: 
Practice, 
Experience, 
Acts, 
Expression 
LIFESTYLE 
Group 
Membership 
(Homosexual 
Identity) 
AFFIRMATION 
Yes-
Saying/Process of 
Coming Out as a 
Homosexual 
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universe” (557). The processes for lumping and splitting the world are directly related to 
the principles/assumptions the researchers had about the nature of the world and how it is 
organized. Ultimately, the definitions or classifications for marking people for group 
membership relied on these principles/assumptions of particular thought communities 
being put forth in these academic articles. These definitions and classifications of group 
membership reflect major points of contention in the essentialist vs. social constructionist 
debates.   
The essentialism vs. social construction debate cannot become a healthy debate 
until all three thought communities’ theoretical positions are revealed and clarified. There 
is a misunderstanding among the different groups over who or what type of people are 
being granted group membership into each thought community. The three thought 
communities perceive themselves to be talking about the same “people,” when in fact the 
people being classified are grouped based on different criteria. The results of this research 
indicate how researchers/theorists perceive one another to be talking about and 
identifying the same things, but are using different requirements or restrictions for group 
membership. The similarity for inclusion into group membership need to be similar 
because the dissimilar criteria may be tracking people into one thought community’s 
research and not into another thought community’s research. If the types of people being 
tracked by the epistemic criteria are different, then the thought communities cannot 
participate in a debate because they have no “common problem.” 
 Essentialists or the natural kinds thought community perceives itself to be 
debating a unified social constructionist perspective. These two social constructionist 
perspectives’ each present a different picture of the world and have different criteria used 
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for group membership. The social kinds thought community’s criteria for inclusion 
appears to be similar to the natural kinds thought community in a “still frame.” The social 
kinds thought community looks quite different from the natural kinds thought community 
when the “still frame” is put back into its dialectical process. The natural kinds thought 
community is focusing on a high degree of exclusivity on the variable identification and 
some-what high degrees of exclusivity on the variables “doing” and “wanting.” This high 
exclusivity severely limits the range of people who are being regarded as homosexual or 
heterosexual. The natural kinds thought community’s criteria for group membership is 
different than the social kinds thought community because the social kinds thought 
community does not focus on exclusivity; but rather allows for a range of identity to be 
possible through the process of “coming out.” 
The social kinds thought community is not consistent in its definition or 
classifications for sexual orientation. The definitions or classifications for sexual 
orientation are employed based on the contextual situation. In most cases, the definition 
or classification of homosexual and heterosexual was mostly a matter of self-
identification. The constitutive definitions focused on the process of people “coming 
out,” or affirming a homosexual identity in a dominant heterosexual environment as 
being the most important aspect of group membership. In the “structures of physical 
health” context, the focal variable was “doing.” The focus on “doing” vs. the “coming 
out” process has quite different implications for who is counting as a homosexual or 
heterosexual. In one case, the individual self-reports and in another the researcher 
determines sexual orientation based on behavior. The social kinds thought community 
needs to have a unified definition among its members if it is to participate in a debate 
109  
with the natural kinds thought community. In order for the natural kinds and social kinds 
thought communities to debate they must compromise on epistemological criteria and not 
focus solely on their practical need for a definition.  
The natural kinds thought community also appears to be arguing against the 
empty kinds thought community. This debate occurs because the empty kinds thought 
community, in some cases, uses the term queer as an umbrella term for lesbian, gay, 
bisexual, transgender and various other sexual identities. The gay and lesbian identities in 
particular are being reacted against by the natural kinds thought community as empty 
kinds. The empty kinds thought community regards sexual orientations according to 
Hacking’s model of social construction. First, they regard sexual orientations not to be 
innate or to be social constructions. Then, they specify the negative implications of this 
social construction. Finally, they emphasize ways to change this construction, which 
results in ultimately dismantling a structural reality.  
The empty kinds thought community emphasizes the first aspect of criteria in 
their thought process as the resistance of normative social structures. Gay, lesbian, and 
bisexual identities are allowed to be placed in this phase because they defy the normative 
heterosexual structures. The next step in the resistance process focuses on the creation of 
new possibilities for “being” and “doing.” At this point gay, lesbian, and bisexual 
identities become negative remains of a hetero-normative system that must be abandoned. 
The new emphasis is to create ways of being that include everyone who resists the 
dichotomous structure. The reason that empty kinds is being perceived to be part of the  
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social kinds thought community appears to be because they include sexual identities in 
their first phase of resistance.  
The principles/assumptions for marking group membership explain the most 
about each thought communities strategies and practices for creating, maintaining, and 
modifying group membership. Each thought community has reasons for identifying 
sexual orientations differently. There are political implications, as specifically mentioned 
in both the social and empty kinds thought community and also within the natural kinds 
thought community. The perception that the scientific method is purely objective is a 
strategy that the natural kinds thought community relies on to potentially mask any 
political implications such as questionably ethical funding or possible personal biases. 
Social policy implications are not the only thing at stake in claiming criteria for group 
membership, the promotion and/or maintenance of a world view/theoretical perspective is 
also central to this issue.  
 
Limitations and Future Research 
 
 
The limitations for this research project were time constraints and limited articles 
for analysis. More criteria for group membership may have emerged as theoretically 
saturated if more articles could have been analyzed. More articles may also have 
contributed to a more precise list of criteria or a more precise thought process for 
inclusion. A historical analysis of definitions of sexual orientation from the cognitive 
sociological perspective is possibility of future research. Another suggestion for a 
possible research project would be to concentrate on the direct relationship between the 
definitions and the political implications. Due to the lengthy nature of this project, the 
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political implications were glossed over as part of the structural context for the social 
kinds thought community’s definitions and the reasons for resistance in the empty kinds 
thought community. Expanding upon the guidelines for this research project by including 
more data may also be an interesting possibility for future research in this area.  
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Appendix A 
Definitions of Sexual Orientation 
 
 
Coding Sheet for Definitions of Sexual Orientation/Sexuality in Research Articles 
 
Article_____   Journal____________________________ Date_____ 
 
Title__________________________________________________________________ 
   
 
Gender_____   Discipline_____ 
 
Focal Group(s) 
 
Homosexual/Gay Males_____ Homosexual/Lesbian Females_____ 
 
Heterosexual Males_____  Heterosexual Females_____ 
 
Bisexual Males_____   Bisexual Females_____ 
 
Trans_____    Queers_____ 
 
Kinds 
 
Natural Kinds_____  Social Kinds_____  Empty Kinds_____ 
 
Constitutive Definition of Sexual Orientation 
 
Behavioral Theory_____  Self-Identification Theory_____ 
 
Dispositional Theory_____  Queer Theory_____ 
 
Other_____ 
 
Operational Definition of Sexual Orientation 
 
Behavioral Theory_____  Self-Identification Theory_____ 
 
Dispositional Theory_____  Queer Theory_____ 
 
Other_____ 
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Appendix B 
Rules for Standard Content Analysis Coding 
 
 
Article 
This refers to the article number which is manually written at the top of each article for 
the purpose of ordinal organization of the articles.  
 
Journal 
This refers to the academic journal from which the article has been extracted.  
 
Date 
This refers to the date that the article was published in the academic journal. 
 
Title 
This refers to the title of the article in the academic journal. 
 
Gender 
This refers to the gender/s of the author/s. It is F for female and M for male author. If 
there is more than one gender than B is used for both. If the gender of the author is not 
identifiable, a ‘Google’ search will be used to acquire this information. 
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Discipline 
This refers to the author/s’ area of academic interest. If there is more than one author, the 
discipline in the majority will be recorded. In the event that there is not a discipline in the 
majority, the first author’s discipline will be recorded. If there is not a discipline 
represented for the author/s, then a ‘Google’ search will be used to acquire and record 
this information. 
 
Focal Groups 
In this section, a check mark is to be applied to each category that is under investigation 
by the author/s of each article. In some cases, more that one category may be checked as 
applicable. The focal groups must be referenced by the author specifically. For example 
the author must state their focus on gays, lesbians, bisexual males and/or females, 
heterosexual males and/or females, queers, and trans (referring to members of the 
transgender/transsexual community). 
 
Kinds 
Natural Kinds: includes labels such as hetero/homo/bisexual, uses keywords such as 
sexual orientation, and it emphasizes a natural or biological origin to a person’s sexual 
desire and/or behavior.  
Social Kinds: includes labels such as hetero/homo/bisexual, uses keywords such as sexual 
orientation, social construction, fluid definitions, emphasize attraction, fantasies, social 
preference, lifestyle choice, self-identification, public identity, structure, and stigma. 
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Empty Kinds: includes no labels or identities and uses key words such as queer, 
sexualities, sexual practices, desires not limited to gender, resistance of binaries, and 
focuses on sexual desire having more to do other factors than a person’s gender.  
 
Constitutive Definition of Sexual Orientation 
This category depicts the definition’s theoretical framework. This usually occurs in the 
first part of the article. This definition often depicts the author’s view of sexual 
orientation. It is not to be confused with the operational theory of sexual orientation 
found in the methods section. 
 
Operational Definition of Sexual Orientation 
This category depicts the rules of inclusion for subjects to be a particular member of one 
of the focal groups. This theoretical framework functions as a criteria check list for how 
the researchers screen their focal group in order to provide a reliable group of a certain 
“type” of person.  
 
Theories of Sexual Orientation 
Behavioral: One’s sexual orientation is determined by the sex/gender of the people that 
he or she has sex with in regards to one’s own sex/gender: if one has sex with people of 
the same sex-gender, then one is homosexual; if one has sex with the people of not the 
same sex-gender, then one is heterosexual; if one has sex with both people who are of the 
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similar and opposite sex-gender, then one is bisexual. The focus is on a person’s behavior 
as being determinate of his or her sex-gender. 
Self-identification: One’s sexual orientation is based on one’s sense of what his or her 
sexual orientation is. The self-identification view emphasizes the reporting of one’s own 
sexual orientation. For example, if someone says or really believes he or she is a 
heterosexual or a homosexual, then he or she is.  
Dispositional: According to this view, a person’s sexual orientation is based on his or her 
sexual desires and fantasies and the sexual behaviors he or she is disposed to engage in 
under ideal conditions.  
Queer: According to this view, a person does not have a sexual orientation or 
categorizing identity related to sexual preference, desire, behavior, activity, etc.  
Other: This represents other possible theories of sexual orientation not included in the 
previous theories. 
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